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Violations During the Pandemic of
Law School Faculties’ Authority to
Decide Methods of Instruction
Richard K. Neumann Jr.

I. Introduction
Beginning in March 2020, when the COVID-19 pandemic initially spread
throughout the country, universities quickly went online as faculties scrambled
to figure out how to teach that way. During the summer and fall of 2020 and
continuing into 2021, decisions were made about whether to return to classrooms
and, if so, when and how. At some universities and their law schools, those
decisions were made in a questionable manner.
A. Governance and Decisions About Teaching in 2020 and 2021
Even after surges of new infections, some university administrators demanded
that courses be taught “in person” as much as possible throughout a university—
including its law school. This might not have happened to most law schools,
but it did happen to a significant number of them. This article’s Part II explains
the extent to which it occurred.
Universities and their administrators who did this were wrong in three ways.
(For brevity, I’ll use the word administrators to include presidents, provosts, and
other managers as well as governing boards of trustees or regents.)
First, a demand of this kind was often based on budgetary fears that students
would not enroll or stay enrolled if they weren’t taught “in person.” These
fears turned out to be unfounded, which Part III explains in detail. Even
though almost half the country’s colleges and universities began the fall 2020
semester primarily or fully online or quickly afterward went primarily or fully
online, undergraduate enrollment in four-year nonprofit institutions did not
fall significantly. Postgraduate and professional school enrollment actually
increased. During the summer of 2020, there were also ample reasons to know
that law schools in particular would be immune from any risk of enrollment
shrinkage, which some universities ignored. Part III also describes partisan
political interference at some state universities.
Richard K. Neumann Jr., Alexander Bickel Distinguished Professor of Law, Maurice A. Deane
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Second, these weren’t decisions about public health alone. They were also
decisions about the quality of education. “In person” usually turned out to be
a completely different modality—some students online, others in a classroom,
and a faculty member trying to teach both groups simultaneously—an untested
and primitive form of hybrid instruction that had no track record and had
never been used on any scale before. It is not HyFlex teaching, and misuse
of that term by university administrators has been at best ill-informed and in
some instances insincere. This article’s Parts IV and XI explain that during the
pandemic the choice has never been between “in person” teaching and online
teaching. Public health concerns continually put some students online because
of contagion risks. The real choice has been between fully online teaching
(nobody in a classroom) and simultaneous hybrid teaching (some students in
a classroom while others are participating online).
Third, when university administrators made unilateral decisions about methods
of instruction, they violated basic rules of shared governance. Some of those
rules are general norms that apply everywhere in a university (Parts V and VI).
The American Association of University Professors (AAUP) investigated some
colleges and universities on this account (Part X).
To the extent a university’s unilateral decisions included a law school, the
university’s actions also violated the American Bar Association’s accreditation
standards1 and the Association of American Law Schools’ Bylaws (Parts VII,
VIII, and IX). In almost all states, a law school’s graduates can be admitted to
the bar only if the law school is accredited by the ABA. AALS member schools
are required to conform to the AALS Bylaws. The ABA and AALS have very
good reasons for requiring that law schools have primary authority to make
their own academic policies. Unlike subjects taught in much of the rest of
a university, law isn’t only a field of study or a body of knowledge. Law is a
profession. Methods of teaching that work elsewhere can be dysfunctional in
education that is expected to turn college graduates into lawyers.
The ABA accreditation standards and the AALS Bylaws combine to require
that decisions about modality—the mode of teaching—need a law faculty’s
approval as a curricular matter if a course is to be taught in a mode different
from the one the faculty had approved before the pandemic began. That is
true regardless of whether a teaching modality is to be used permanently or
temporarily. Both the ABA and the AALS make the law school responsible for
the quality of education—not just for the long haul in a school’s history, but in
every semester of a student’s education.
In a typical law school, nearly all courses have been approved by the faculty
for genuine in-person instruction with all students in the classroom—the teaching modality in use for hundreds of years. A tiny number of courses, if any at
all, might have been faculty-approved for fully online instruction in which no
students would be in a classroom. But in a typical law school before the pandemic, no course had been approved by a faculty for the untested modality of
1.

To be precise, law schools are accredited by the Council of the ABA Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar.
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simultaneous hybrid instruction, the faults of which are described in Part IV.
If a course were to be taught that way, both the ABA and the AALS require
that the decisions be made inside the law school, and the AALS additionally
requires that the decisions be made by the law school’s faculty—not made by
administrators elsewhere and imposed on the law school.
This article is about governance—who has the authority to decide—not about
what the decisions should be. I discuss simultaneous hybrid teaching only to
explain what the choices have been. A faculty might decide to use it as a modality,
despite its faults, because the faculty sees value in certain situations—for example,
with first-year students in their first semester. Reasonable faculty members can
have differing views on this, and I take no position on it.
This article is not about individual faculty members’ academic freedom,
although in some respects the pandemic does raise academic freedom issues (Parts
V and VI). Nor is it about public health issues affecting faculty and involving,
for example, the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act. These issues are being written about thoughtfully elsewhere.2
B. The Context: Pandemic Mortality
As of June 30, 2022 — when the pandemic has not yet ended — the number
of people in the United States who have died of COVID-19 is much more than the
total of all the Americans who died in all the wars in the 20th century.
2.

See, for example, Gary J. Simson et al., It’s Alright, Ma, It’s Life and Life Only: Are Colleges and
Universities Legally Obligated during the Coronavirus Pandemic to Exempt High-Risk Faculty from In-Person
Teaching Requirements?, 48 Pepperdine L. Rev. 649 (2021); Meera Deo, Investigating Pandemic Effects
in Legal Academia, 89 Ford. L. Rev. 2467 (2021); Catherine A. Sandoval et al., Legal Education in
the Era of COVID-19: Putting Health, Safety and Equity First, 61 Santa Clara L. Rev. 367 (2020).
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Table 13
COVID deaths Compared to Combat Deaths

U.S. deaths directly caused by COVID
January 20, 2020, to June 30, 2022

U.S. deaths in combat or resulting
from military service in the
20th Century

World War I (1917–1918).........116,516
World War II (1941–1945)........405,399
COVID (2020, 2021, 2022)............1,014,262 Korean War (1950–1953)..........36,574
Vietnam War (1965–1975)..........58,220
Gulf War
(1991).......................383
COVID.............................1,014,262 deaths 20th century wars........617,092 deaths
as of June 30, 2022.......................127 weeks total duration..................1,006 weeks

Not only has COVID killed more, but it has also killed at a faster rate. In
World War 2, Americans died in combat or from military service at the rate
of 2,111 per week. But Americans have died at almost four times that rate from
Covid—7,978 deaths per week.
During the first ten months of 2021, COVID was leading cause of death
among persons aged 45 to 54 years and the second leading cause of death among
those aged 35 to 44 years.4
3.

Left column: Trends in Number of COVID-19 Cases and Deaths in the US Reported to CDC, by State/
Territory, Ctrs. for Disease Control and Prevention, https://covid.cdc.gov/covid-datatracker/#trends_totaldeaths (last visisted June 30, 2022). Weeks measured from first reported
U.S. case (Jan. 23, 2020). Right column: America’s Wars, Dep’t of Veterans Affs., https://www.
va.gov/opa/publications/factsheets/fs_americas_wars.pdf. Weeks measured from declaration
of war (WW1), first military action involving the U.S. (WW2, Korea, Gulf), or military action
on which Congressional authorization was based (Vietnam, Maddox incident) to armistice or
last U.S. military action.
		
The COVID column doesn’t include deaths indirectly caused by COVID—for example,
people who died of heart attacks because they couldn’t be treated in time while hospital
emergency rooms were filled with COVID patients.
4.

Meredith S. Shiels et al., Leading Causes of Death in the US During the COVID-19 Pandemic, March
2020 to October 2021, JAMA Internal Med. (July 5, 2022).
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Table 2 shows the COVID timeline in the United States in the context of
higher education.
Table 25
March 2020 to June 2022
Deaths
added to
CDC data
that day
March 15, 2020

19

Total U.S.
COVID
deaths

Factual context

101 Most universities have pivoted online.

April 15, 2020

2,707

May 24, 2020

814

100,413 Deaths pass 100,000.

June 22, 2020

431

122,724 The summer lull.

July 30, 2020

1,422

August 20, 2020

33,825 A month later.

158,641 The summer surge.

996

181,016 Fall semesters beginning or about to
begin.

November 4, 2020

1,308

240,223 Autumn surge begins. Continues into
winter.

January 13, 2021

4,082

402,160 Peak of the winter surge.

February 25, 2021

2,936

520,326 Winter surge continuing.

July 5, 2021

107

605,168 The summer lull.

August 20, 2021

1,586

631,601 Fall semesters beginning or about to
begin.

September 14, 2021

2,440

672,602 Early autumn surge.

February 1, 2022

4,230

896,201 Peak of the winter surge.

April 16, 2020

48

June 30, 2022

487

989,008 The spring lull.
1,014,262 Compare to June 22, 2020, and July
5, 2021.

California, Texas, and Florida are the largest states by population. California had two surges of deaths: Dec. 2020–March 2021 and Feb.–March 2022.
Texas had four surges: July–Aug. 2020, Nov. 2020–Feb. 2021, Aug.–Nov. 2021,
Jan.–March 2022. Florida also had four: July–Sept. 2020, Nov. 2020–Feb. 2021,
July–Oct. 2021, Jan.–Feb. 2022.
The national COVID death rate is 305 per 100,000 population as of June
30, 2022. The death rate for every state is in Appendix A near the end of this
article. The rates for the largest states are California (232), Texas (300), and
Florida (353).
5.

Trends in Number of COVID-19 Cases and Deaths in the US Reported to CDC, by State/Territory, Ctrs.
for Disease Control and Prevention, https://covid.cdc.gov/covid-data-tracker/#trends_
totaldeaths. For the dates when universities went online in March 2020, Hannah Lu et
al., Are College Campuses Superspreaders? A Data-Driven Modeling Study, 24 Comput. Methods in
Biomechanics & Biomedical Eng’g 1136 (2021), https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.
1080/10255842.2020.1869221.
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The highest COVID death rates are in Mississippi (421 per 100,000 population); Arizona (419); Alabama (403); West Virginia (394); Tennessee (391);
Arkansas (384); and New Jersey (383).
The lowest COVID death rates are in Vermont (104); Hawaii (105); Utah (151);
Alaska (171); Washington (174); Maine (180); Oregon (185); New Hampshire
(190); and the District of Columbia (191).
The CDC reports deaths for New York City separately from the rest of New
York State. The state data includes the suburban counties around New York
City but excludes the city itself. The state’s COVID death rate is 255. The city’s
death rate is 485. But half the city’s deaths occurred at the beginning of the
pandemic, in April and May 2020, when the city was national COVID epicenter.
During those two months, one out of every five people in the United States
who died of COVID died in New York City.
These numbers are limited to deaths. They don’t include damage to the quality
of life for survivors from the exacerbation of preexisting medical conditions or
from the debilitating brain fog, fatigue, and neurological harm of long COVID.
C. Classrooms and COVID
We take air for granted because we can’t see it even though we’re immersed
in it. Much of what floats in the air is as invisible as the air itself.
We are constantly aware of air’s temperature. But we barely notice air’s freshness or lack of it. Modern and modernized classroom buildings are designed to
minimize the intrusion of outside air, which is usually colder or warmer than the
narrow temperature range in which people feel comfortable. That is to reduce
heating and air-conditioning costs and harm to the environment from coal-fired
electrical-generating plants. In a modern or modernized public building, few or
no windows can be opened, and heating and air conditioning systems mostly
recirculate the air already in the building, introducing little, if any, outside air.
The more people in a room relative to the room’s size, the more each person
breathes air that has very recently been inside other people’s lungs. The New York
Times created a simulation dramatically illustrating this in a K12 classroom. A
link to the simulation is in the footnote.6 You can see the breath of a single
infected student quickly sending viral particles to every part of the room. The
simulation shows the mitigation effects of opening a window,7 installing a fan
6.

Nick Bartzokas et al., Why Opening Windows is a Key to Reopening Schools, N.Y. Times (Feb. 26, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2021/02/26/science/reopen-schools-safety-ventilation.
html?action=click&module=RelatedLinks&pgtype=Article.

7.

A colleague and I taught in the same classroom, he in fall 2021 and I in spring 2022. Each class
had more than 90 students. Because humans exhale carbon dioxide, a room’s CO2 level is a
rough way of measuring whether breathed air is being replaced with fresh air. We placed CO2
monitors at the front of the room during a couple of his classes and a few of mine. During
his classes, the CO2 count rose steeply in the first five minutes and stayed in the 1,500 ppm
range until after students had left the room. During my classes, the CO2 count stayed in the
800 ppm range throughout. The monitors were at the front of the room. In the back wall of
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in the window, and installing a portable HEPA-filtering air purifier in the room.
Unless the room has all three of these, the air exhaled by the infected student
continues to circulate and is breathed by others in the room.
The National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences, part of the federal government’s National Institutes of Health, recommends that a room’s
ventilation accomplish “a minimum of 5–6 air changes per hour,” which would
“replace about 99% of the volume of air in an indoor space with fresh filtered or
outdoor air every 45–60 minutes.”8 That might seem like a lot. But after watching
the Times’ simulation, you might want air replacement to happen much more
frequently in a classroom where you teach during the pandemic.
In many universities, none of these mitigation measures occurred. Portable
HEPA-filtered air purifiers weren’t purchased and installed. And ventilation
couldn’t be improved without replacing classroom windows and retrofitting
entire HVAC systems, which would be colossally expensive and couldn’t possibly be accomplished within weeks.9
II. How Law School Modality Decisions Were Made for Fall 2020
In September and October 2020, I gathered information from faculty
members about what happened at forty-seven law schools, almost a quarter of
the total number of schools accredited by the ABA. Responses fell into three
patterns, summarized in Table 3. Details are in Appendix B at the end of this
article. Schools are not identified by name.
this large classroom, two windows can be opened. The only variable is that my colleague did
not open the windows, and I did. See Zhe Peng & Jose L. Jimenez, Exhaled CO2 as a COVID-19
Infection Risk Proxy for Different Indoor Environments and Activities, 8 Env’t. & Sci. Tech. Letters 392,
https://doi.org/10.1021/acs.estlett.1c00183.
8.

Selection and Use of Portable Air Cleaners to Protect Workers from Exposure to SARS-CoV-2, Nat’l Inst. of
Env’t Health Scis., https://tools.niehs.nih.gov/wetp/public/hasl_get_blob.cfm?ID=13021.

9.

Many universities bragged that they upgraded their HVAC systems by installing “hospitalgrade” MERV-13 filters. A MERV number is just a measure of a filter’s capabilities, like a
car engine’s horsepower number. A MERV-13 filter is more efficient than a MERV-12 filter.
MERV-13 filters are the densest ones that won’t damage a typical HVAC system. Although
used in hospitals, MERV-13 filters can be purchased by consumers in sizes that fit in the slots
where filters are supposed to be replaced several times a year in typical home air-conditioning
systems. MERV-13s are in my home. In a public building, replacing the filters with MERV-13s
would have been a wise improvement for indoor air quality long before the pandemic.
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Table 3
Summary of Fall 2020 Modality Decision-Making at
Forty-Seven Law Schools10

# = 49

Group A
32 schools

Group B
6 schools

%

Types of school situations—
grouped by responses from Appendix B
1.
2.
3.

68%
4.

1.
2.
13%

3.

1.
2.
3.
Group C
9 schools

19%

4.
5.
6.

Individual faculty decided for themselves.
Only volunteers taught in classrooms.
Decanal or other administrative decision based on or
consistent with a faculty consensus (at most of these
schools, all or nearly all classes were online).
Individual faculty were to be given choices, but the
school went 100% online because of local community
public health conditions.
Decanal decisions with accommodations granted
Decanal authority exercised after consultation with
faculty.
Faculty applied to teach remotely based on personal
reasons, age, and family situations—applications usually
approved.
University pressured law school to require in-person
teaching unless a teacher could justify remaining offcampus.
Imposition of simultaneous hybrid teaching over faculty
wishes.
University said anyone without an ADA accommodation
could be made to teach in person.
University and deans decided after accommodations
based on personal and family situations—no faculty
consultation.
University required as much in-person teaching as
possible, using simultaneous hybrid, within public
health requirements
University formula would have required significant
percentage of in-person teaching, but the school went
100% online because of local community public health
conditions.

In Table 3, the phrase “individual faculty decided for themselves” means that
either (1) faculty stated individual preferences and were scheduled accordingly
or (2) faculty who thought it unwise to teach in person had to state a reason
but virtually every reason was accepted and all faculty who wanted to teach
online did so.
Curricular decisions include modality—not only whether an offering is to be
a casebook course, a writing course, a clinic, a simulation course, or a seminar,
but also whether it is to be taught in person (the default) or online. In normal
times, curricular decisions would be made in faculty meetings on the basis
10.

For the meaning of “simultaneous hybrid,” see text infra at notes 49-58.
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of committee reports. During the summer of 2020, that was impractical, and
many schools’ faculties made decisions through other processes, most often
individually but also through informal consensus building.
In Group A (68% of the total), faculty had the primary role in making modality
decisions, either individually or in collaboration with a dean’s office, resulting
in a consensus that equaled faculty approval, with no apparent interference
from a university. The most common pattern was a school giving each faculty
member the decision to choose the most appropriate modality for that faculty
member’s courses. In Group B (13%), faculty had a role but did not control the
decisions. In Group C (1%), university administrators controlled the decisions.11
At a number of schools, perhaps more so in Groups B and C, the burden
of being in a classroom and teaching in a simultaneous hybrid modality has
fallen disproportionately on faculty members who are not on tenure track. The
consequences of that, and the memory of it, will be with us for a long time.
In November and December 2020, D. Benjamin Barros and Cameron M.
Morrisey surveyed law school deans about their administrative experiences at
that point in the pandemic. One of their questions was “If your law school is
part of a university, how much freedom did the law school have to make its own
decisions on whether to hold classes remotely?” Respondents were to choose
a numerical point of a scale from zero to seven—the lower the number, the less
freedom the dean had. Forty-one deans answered the question. Thirteen deans
chose the number six or seven. Eighteen deans chose zero, one, or two.12
Two separate surveys—mine of faculty and Barros and Morrisey’s of deans—
show that a significant number of universities were interfering with law school
curricular decisions.
Many faculty members have had strong reactions to the process through
which these decisions were made. In some instances, the process has profoundly
affected the relationship between faculties and their law schools and universities.
At some schools, the relationship seems to have been strengthened through
mutual respect and collaboration in a crisis. But at the minority of schools
where faculty jurisdiction has been interfered with, the relationship seems to
have been damaged, in some instances so deeply that it might not be repaired.
III. Why Some Universities Interfered with Faculty Governance
It is difficult at this moment to pin down the complete motivations behind
what each individual university did. But there have been two patterns—one
based on budget fears and assumptions and another separately based on political
11.

The New York Times has a database showing the number of COVID-19 infections reported
at nearly every university in the country. Tracking the Coronavirus at US College and Universities, N.Y.
Times, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/us/covid-college-cases-tracker.html (last
updated Dec. 11, 2020).

12.

D. Benjamin Barros & Cameron M. Morissey, A Survey of Law School Deans on the Impact of the
COVID-19 Pandemic, U. Toledo L. Rev. 241, 246 (2021).
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interference. Before discussing them, it is necessary to summarize the context
created by the pandemic.
During the spring and summer of 2020, a number of scientific and mathematical studies predicted the campus outbreaks that occurred in the fall. Several
of those studies, and the dates on which they became public, are listed in the
footnote.13 They were reported, beginning in April, in the Chronicle of Higher
Education and Inside Higher Ed.14 An additional and exhaustive study, published in July 2020 online in JAMA Network, equated a reliably, though not
completely, safe campus reopening with COVID-testing every student every
13.

Kim A Weeden & Benjamin Cornwell, The Small World Network of College Classes: Implications for
Epidemic Spread on a University Campus, OSF, https://osf.io/6kuet/ (created April 11, updated
June 28); Benjamin Lopman et al., A Model of COVID-19 Transmission and Control on University
Campuses, MedRxiv (July 24), https://www.medrxiv.org/content/10.1101/2020.06.23.20138
677v3; Philip T. Gressman & Jennifer R. Peck, Simulating COVID-19 in a University Environment,
328 Mathematical Biosciences 108436 (2020) (e-published Aug. 3, 2020); John M. Drake,
Scenario Analysis for an Outbreak of COVID-19 on a University Campus (University of Georgia Working
Paper, Aug. 15, 2020), https://github.com/CEIDatUGA/covid-university-reopening/blob/
master/manuscript.pdf; Gavin Yamey & Rochelle P. Walensky, Covid-19: Re-opening Universities Is
High Risk, BMJ (Sept. 1, 2020), https://www.bmj.com/content/370/bmj.m3365. In December
2020, Rochelle Walensky was selected by President-elect Biden to head the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC) and now serves as CDC director.

14.

Among the earliest were Elizabeth Redden, Degrees of Separation, Inside Higher Ed, (Apr. 14,
2020), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2020/04/14/sociologists-say-their-findingsstudent-interconnectedness-suggest-caution-needed; Michael Vasquez & Francie Diep, What
Covid-19 Computer Models Are Telling Colleges About the Fall, Chron. of Higher Educ. (June 19, 2020),
https://www.chronicle.com/article/what-covid-19-computer-models-are-telling-colleges-aboutthe-fall. Similar stories continued through the summer in the same publications and in the
general media.
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two days throughout the semester15—something so difficult that only a handful
of colleges and universities came close to doing it.16
A. Budget Motivations
In a widely reported March 2020 survey of high school seniors who had
planned to attend college, 17% said they were considering not enrolling full
time for the 2020–2021 academic year, the most commonly voiced options being
to enroll only part time or to take a gap year.17 At the same time, university
administrators were hearing from current students unhappy with the quality of
online instruction they had received in March and April, when entire faculties
had to teach online without advance planning. Lawyers had seen class action
opportunities, and some colleges and universities had been sued on the theory
that students had paid for classroom-quality teaching and gotten less than what
they were paying for.18
15.

A. David Paltiel et al., Assessment of SARS-CoV-2 Screening Strategies to Permit the Safe Reopening of
College Campuses in the United States, 3(7) JAMA e2016818 (July 31, 2020), https://jamanetwork.
com/journals/jamanetworkopen/fullarticle/2768923; Amelia Nierenberg & Adam Pasick,
How to Return to Campus Safely: Test, Then Test Again, N.Y. Times, Dec. 7, 2020, https://www.
nytimes.com/2020/12/07/us/college-campus-coronavirus-test-spring-semester.html (“The
most important [factor in campus safety] seems to be aggressive testing. Many colleges that
ran their own testing programs successfully kept cases low; those that didn’t often became
hot spots.”).
A study released on December 4, 2020, concluded that in fall 2020 infection rates did not
correlate with the number of students on campus, the density of dorm occupancy, or whether
instruction was “remote” or “hybrid.” Christopher W. Stubbs et al., The Impacts of Testing Cadence,
Mode of Instruction, and Student Density on Fall 2020 COVID-19 Rates on Campus, MedRxiv (Dec. 12,
2020), https://www.medrxiv.org/content/10.1101/2020.12.08.20244574v1. But those inferences
are questionable because the sample of thirteen schools was unrepresentative of higher education nationally. They are all in Massachusetts and New York, where state governments had
imposed strict requirements on the general population, bringing statewide infection rates
well below the national average. Seven of the thirteen are among the wealthiest schools in
the country and could spend money on general campus safety measures that more typical
institutions could not afford. And the term “hybrid” has no statistically measurable basis. It
is impossible to quantify the percentage of students who are actually in classrooms. See this
article’s Part IV for why.

16.

“[D]ata from more than 1,400 colleges . . . compiled by the College Crisis Initiative at
Davidson College . . . show that more than 2 out of 3 colleges with in-person classes
either have no clear testing plan or are testing only students who are at risk.” Elissa Nadworny & Sean McMinn, Even In COVID-19 Hot Spots, Many Colleges Aren’t Aggressively Testing
Students, Nat’l Pub. Radio (Oct. 6, 2020), https://www.npr.org/2020/10/06/919159473/
even-in-covid-hot-spots-many-colleges-arent-aggressively-testing-students.

17.

Eric Hoover, How Is Covid-19 Changing Prospective Students’ Plans? Here’s an Early Look,
C h r o n . H i g h e r E d u c . ( M a r. 2 5 , 2 0 2 0 ) , https://www.chronicle.com/article/
how-is-covid-19-changing-prospective-students-plans-heres-an-early-look/.

18.

Insisting on in-person instruction to avoid tuition lawsuits creates the risk of a different
group of lawsuits from faculty, staff, and students who could become ill in connection with
contagion clusters identifiable to a campus. It is unnecessary here to comment on what a
university’s choice of which lawsuit risk to avoid reveals about the university itself. That is
part of a broader question of what is revealed about a university and its administration by
the way each of the pandemic-related risks has been ranked among university priorities.
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A number of university administrators seem to have assumed that (1) many
current and prospective students actually would not attend unless promised as
much classroom teaching as possible and (2) this would be true everywhere in
a university and not just in undergraduate departments. Both of these assumptions turned out to be wrong.
Even though 34% of colleges and universities began the fall 2020 semester
or quickly went primarily online and another 10% did so fully online,19 total
national undergraduate enrollment in the fall at four-year nonprofit colleges
and universities, public and private collectively, fell less than 1% according to
the National Student Clearinghouse Research Center, which collects a wide
range of student data every year. The details are in Table 4 together with the
law student enrollment statistics that law schools are required to report to the
American Bar Association.20
Table 4
Fall Semester Law School and University Enrollments, 2017 through 202021
Postgraduate
at public
& private
nonprofit &
% change from
the preceding
year

Undergraduate
at public
4-yr institutions
&
% change from
the preceding
year

Undergraduate
at private
nonprofit 4-yr
institutions &
% change from
the preceding
year

Fall

1st
year
J.D.

Total
J.D.

2017

37,320

110,176

2,431,453
+0.3%

6,777,472
–0.2%

2,653,327
–0.9%

2018

38,390

111,561

2,513,558
+3.4%

6,757,862
–0.3%

2,680,946
+1.0%

2019

38,283

112,882

2,533,530
+0.8%

6,644,260
–1.7%

2,655,124
–1.0%

19.

See Here’s Our List of Colleges’ Reopening Models, Chron. Higher Educ. (Oct. 1, 2020, 2:04 PM),
https://www.chronicle.com/search?q=Here%27s+Our+List+of+Colleges%27+Reopening+M
odels#nt=navsearch.

20.

In the background is a solidly based projection well known to university administrators but
little known among faculties. Before the pandemic, higher education enrollment had been
projected to fall precipitously after 2026 because of falling birthrates dating from the Great
Recession that began in 2007. Chron. Higher Educ., The Looming Enrollment Crisis
(2019); Nathan D. Grawe, Demographics and the Demand for Higher Education (2018).
This cliff will hit law schools around 2029.

21.

For J.D. enrollment statistics, see the ABA’s Standard 509 Information Report Data Overview documents (most recently posted Dec. 15, 2021) at https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/
aba/administrative/legal_education_and_admissions_to_the_bar/statistics/2021/2021509-enrollment-summary-report.pdf. For the other statistics in Table 4, see Current Term Enrollment
Estimates, Nat’l Student Clearinghouse Rsch. Ctr. (most recently posted Jan. 13, 2022),
https://nscresearchcenter.org/current-term-enrollment-estimates/. Click on the Past Report
PDF links for fall semesters. See the Fall 2020 and Fall 2021 Reports’ Table 3 and the Fall
2017 Report’s Table 5.
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2020

38,202

114,520

2,628,496
+3.7%

6,596,078
–0.7%

2,619,271
–1.4%

2021

42,718

117,501

2,638,595
+0.0%

6,344,722
–3.8%

2,560,584
–2.2%
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In fall 2020, postgraduate enrollment grew by 3.7%. When postgraduate
enrollment is added to the undergraduate numbers, total fall 2020 enrollment
at four-year public and private nonprofit colleges and universities was almost
exactly the same as it had been a year earlier, before the pandemic began:
11,832,914 (fall 2019) and 11,843,845 (fall 2020).22
First-year J.D. enrollment was almost exactly the same in fall 2020 as it been
in the two preceding years, and it grew in fall 2021. Total J.D. enrollment grew
in fall 2020 and grew again in fall 2021. J.D. enrollment and post-graduate
enrollment generally have been robust during the pandemic.
The most likely cause for undergraduate enrollment losses has nothing to do
with classroom and online teaching. The pandemic left many families without
financial resources to pay college costs. The unemployment rate nationally
varied between 10.2% and 14.7% from April through July 202023—the months
during which high school seniors make enrollment deposits and first-installment
fall tuition payments are due for all students. Businesses were contracting, and
many employees who still had jobs couldn’t be sure that by fall they would
still be working full time or at all. In ordinary times, college costs can have a
staggering effect on a household budget. Committing to pay those costs during
the pandemic might be far less than prudent in a family that is not affluent. A
student who doesn’t attend might mention lack of classroom teaching as a way
of feeling less bad about a decision that is really financial.
22.

The media reported that undergraduate enrollment fell 3.6% nationally in fall 2020.
That percentage is higher than the one in Table 4 because it includes two-year
associate degree community colleges, which lost 10.1% of their total enrollment,
which is irrelevant to universities with law schools. It is troubling, however, for a
separate reason: income inequality. Two-year associate degree community colleges
have student bodies that are especially vulnerable in a weak economy, and those
schools play a unique upward mobility role. An associate degree helps students,
who are often employed while studying, move from poorly paid jobs requiring
only a high school diploma into better-paying ones. Two-year community college
enrollment has been falling for a long time, though not as dramatically as it did in
2020. In fall 2010, community colleges had 7,030,517 students. In fall 2019, enrollment was down to 5,368,470 students. In the pandemic fall semester of 2020, it
was only 4,824,203. Whatever the causes for this long-term decline, accelerated
in a pandemic year, community colleges have become substantially less able to
help students and their families move upward from low-income jobs. See Lee
Gardner, How the Pandemic Worsened—and Highlighted—Community Colleges’ Chronic Challenges, Chron. Higher Educ. (Dec. 8, 2020), https://www.chronicle.com/article/
how-the-pandemic-worsened-and-highlighted-community-colleges-chronic-challenges.

23.

Labor Force Statistics from the Current Population Survey, U.S. Bureau of Lab. Stats., https://data.
bls.gov/timeseries/LNS14000000?years_option=all_years.
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It was already obvious in the summer of 2020—when schools were deciding
how teaching would occur in the fall—that law school enrollment would be
steady or better. In a July 2020 survey of ninety-four law school admissions
offices, 52% expected their first-year class enrolling in August to be about the
same size as the one that enrolled in 2019, and 26% expected their 2020 firstyear class to be larger than the year before.24 There are also structural reasons
for continuity inherent in the nature of law schools and their student bodies.
For students who are already in law school, there are strong incentives to stay
there. It would be difficult for a law student to find any kind of career-consistent
full-time employment while taking a year off during a pandemic. There is a risk
that student loan repayments might be required during some of that year. At
some schools, the student could lose a scholarship. Delaying admission to the
bar by a year would also delay by a year the moment at which a law student
begins earning a professional-level salary. There were additional—and obvious—
incentives for a college senior to enroll in a law school. In 2020, college seniors
were graduating into a bleak job market with high unemployment. Being out
of school and unemployed can be a worse option than enrolling in law school
and eventually earning a higher salary as a professional. And the immediate
cost of legal education can seem bearable because limitations that restrict the
size of federal student loans to undergraduate students don’t apply to law and
other postgraduate students.25
Many universities suffered large financial losses during the pandemic. They
have had to spend substantial amounts of money, not previously budgeted, on
health measures to make campuses less dangerous. At most universities, revenue
declined significantly,26 and hundreds of thousands of university employees lost
their jobs.27 But, as the faculty at Johns Hopkins discovered, university claims
of adversity shouldn’t be taken at face value. There the faculty demanded and
got a forensic audit of the university’s finances. In April 2020, the university
had projected a loss of $51 million for the 2020 fiscal year. But the audit showed
that the university eventually ended the fiscal year with a $75 million surplus.28
24.

Ka re n S l o a n , L a w S c h o o l s E x p e c t E n ro l l m e n t s t o R e m a i n S t e a d y Am i d C O V I D 1 9 , L a w . c o m ( J u l y 2 8 , 2 0 2 0 a t 2 : 5 4 P M ) h ttps://www.law.com/2020/07/28/
law-schools-expect-enrollment-to-remain-steady-amid-covid-19/.

25.

Federal Student Loans for College or Career School are an Investment in Your Future, Fed. Student Aid,
U.S. Dep’t Educ., https://studentaid.gov/understand-aid/types/loans.

26.

Paul N. Friga, How Much Has Covid Cost Colleges? $183 Billion, Chron. Higher Educ. (Feb. 5,
2021), https://www.chronicle.com/article/how-to-fight-covids-financial-crush.

27.

Dan Bauman, The Pandemic Has Pushed Hundreds of Thousands of Workers Out of Higher Education, Chron.
Higher Educ. (Oct. 6, 2020), https://www.chronicle.com/article/how-the-pandemic-has-shrunkhigher-educations-work-force. Job losses fell disproportionately on staff, who are more ethnically
diverse than faculty. “While workers of color represent just a quarter of higher ed’s labor force
. . . more than half the workers who lost jobs have been non-white.” Dan Bauman, Here’s Who Was
Hit Hardest by Higher Ed’s Pandemic-Driven Job Losses, Chron. Higher Educ. (April 19, 2021), https://
www.chronicle.com/article/heres-who-was-hit-hardest-by-higher-eds-pandemic-driven-job-losses.

28.

François Furstenberg, The Era of Artificial Scarcity, Chron. Higher Educ. (April 8, 2021),
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Nor should claims of financial adversity be accepted without examining the
pandemic’s effect, if any, on the salaries and other compensation paid to a
university’s executives.29 One would expect sacrifices to be shared by all.
Revenue from undergraduates comes mostly in three forms: tuition, dorm
rent, and dining hall meals. Universities’ promises of fall semester in-person
teaching were intended to protect all three revenue streams. Dorm rent and
dining hall revenue matter more than many faculties realize. If a school went
100% online in the fall semester, it might lose a relatively small fraction of its
tuition revenue. But it would lose almost all its dorm rent and dining hall revenue
because the only students on campus would be those who have special reasons
for being there.30 Because enrollments nationally did not fall, university-wide
faculties that found themselves in classrooms turned out to be there in part so
their universities could collect dorm rent and dining hall money from students
who were on campus to attend those classes.31
https://www.chronicle.com/article/the-era-of-artificial-scarcity. “Irene Mulvey, president
of the American Association of University Professors, . . . says that, while she understands
that the pandemic has had financial impacts, they ‘might not be as bad as some institutions
want to claim, because they might want to use the crisis to make cuts they’ve wanted to
make all along.’” Lee Gardner, The Great Contraction: Cuts Alone Will Not Be Enough to Turn Colleges’
Fortunes Around, Chron. Higher Educ. (Feb. 15, 2021), https://www.chronicle.com/article/
the-great-contraction.
29.

The Chronicle of Higher Education publishes salary and other compensation paid to university
presidents and other highly paid university executives. The data comes from the Forms
990 that colleges and universities are required to file with the Internal Revenue Service.
Usually the Chronicle publishes the data about two years after colleges and universities are
required to file the form, which itself is the year after the money is actually paid. The 2020
and 2021 data will thus be published in 2023 and 2024, respectively. Universities are capable
of showing their Forms 990 directly to faculties although a university might not easily agree
to do so, and interpreting a Form 990 requires some specialized accounting abilities. The
Chronicle interprets the forms and publishes the data in a way that anyone can understand.
The 2019 numbers are at Julia Piper and Brian O’Leary, Executive Compensation at Public and
Private Colleges, Chron. Higher Educ. (Feb 15, 2022), https://www.chronicle.com/article/
executive-compensation-at-public-and-private-colleges/#id=table_private_2019.

30.

Audrey Williams June, The Coronavirus Has Emptied Dorms and Dining Halls. Here’s Why Refunds for
Them Are a Tricky Calculation., Chron. Higher Educ. (April 10, 2020), https://www.chronicle.
com/article/the-coronavirus-has-emptied-dorms-and-dining-halls-heres-why-refunds-for-themare-a-tricky-calculation/.

31.

Some, but not most, of the schools that went entirely online also voluntarily cut their own
tuition revenue, typically by giving the entire student body a 10% discount. A school’s decision to discount tuition might not be correlated to the size of its endowment. See, e.g., Lilah
Burke, Rebates and Reversals, Inside Higher Ed (July 24, 2020), https://www.insidehighered.
com/news/2020/07/24/some-colleges-discount-tuition-prices-online-fall (“Nonselective
institutions with small endowments may need to cut to remain competitive. . . . [W]ellheeled universities would choose to discount tuition [out of] a mix of altruism and pressure
from students); Danielle Douglas-Gabriel & Lauren Lumpkin, Discount, Freeze or Increase?
How Universities are Handling Tuition this Fall, Wash. Post (July 31, 2020, 12:00 PM), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/discount-freeze-or-increase-how-universitiesare-handling-tuition-this-fall/2020/07/31/63d6fae6-ccf3-11ea-bc6a-6841b28d9093_story.html;
Emma Kerr and Sarah Wood, Colleges Giving Tuition Discounts, U.S. News (Jan. 5, 2022,
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The budgetary reasons for forcing faculty to teach in classrooms are largely
irrelevant to law schools. It was obvious during the summer of 2020 that national
law school enrollment would not fall regardless of how classes were taught. Even
if a law school was 100% online, a university would lose little or no dorm rent
from absent law students. Law students typically live off campus anyway and
have always done so. Losses from dining hall revenue would be tiny in relation
to the whole, because law students living off campus typically don’t eat three
meals a day on campus. And law students aren’t numerically a significant part
of a university’s student body.
B. Political Interference at Some State Universities
Barros and Morrisey’s survey of deans included this question: “To what degree
did you feel political pressure from public officials to hold classes in-person?”
Of the 45 deans who answered the question, eight, all of them at public universities, “indicated a strong degree of political pressure to hold in-person classes.”32
This is a sample of the articles that appeared in the Chronicle of Higher Education
and elsewhere in the media—
In opening their campuses this fall, the presidents of Iowa State University and
the University of Iowa . . . have had to appease politicians and trustees who
demand face-to-face instruction . . . . The University of Iowa and Iowa State
have become homes to some of the worst outbreaks of Covid-19 in the nation.
. . . Faculty members at both universities say the staff and administration are
doing their best but have their hands tied by a lack of support from Gov. Kim
Reynolds . . . and pressure from members of the Board of Regents, who are
appointed by the governor.33

Table 5 shows the results of this type of political interference.
9:30 AM), https://www.usnews.com/education/best-colleges/paying-for-college/articles/
these-colleges-are-giving-tuition-discounts-this-fall.
32.

Barros & Morissey, supra note 12, at 247-248. See Lindsay Ellis, Colleges Pledged to Follow the Science.
But Divides in Reopening Plans Reflected State Politics., Chron. Higher Educ. (Oct. 12, 2020), https://
www.chronicle.com/article/colleges-pledged-to-follow-the-science-but-divides-in-reopeningplans-reflected-state-politics; Has Reopening Become a Partisan Issue? Chron. Higher Educ. (June
5, 2020), https://www.chronicle.com/article/has-reopening-become-a-partisan-issue.

33.

Eric Kelderman, Iowa Universities Are Caught Between Covid-19 and Politics, Chron.
H igher
E duc .
(Sept.
7,
2020),
https://www.chronicle.com/article/
iowa-universities-are-caught-between-coronavirus-and-politics.
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Table 5
COVID Cases at Flagship Iowa Public Universities
and at Fully Online Universities of Comparable Size34
Fall 2020
opening status
(Oct. 1, 2020)

COVID cases
per thousand
students
(Dec. 11, 2020)

COVID cases
(Dec. 11, 2020)

Size of
student
body

Iowa State
Univ.

primarily in
person

71.3

2496

34,992

Univ. of Iowa

primarily in
person

98.0

3102

31,656

Drexel Univ.

fully online

4.3

106

24,634

George Wash.
Univ.

fully online

7.8

221

28,172

Harvard Univ.

fully online

10.1

318

31,566

Johns Hopkins
Univ.

fully online

30.6

799

26,152

Michigan State
Univ.

fully online

46.7

2350

50,351

Univ. of
Pennsylvania

fully online

41.8

1081

25,860

Except for Michigan State, all the non-Iowa universities in Table 5 are in
older cities where a sizeable portion of the general population mingles daily
on foot in public places and in public transportation—an environment in which
COVID is easily spread. Those universities went fully online and limited their
COVID cases. The Iowa universities did not, with consequences for their
students, faculties, and staff.
High on-campus infection rates like the ones in Iowa also endangered local
people in surrounding communities.35 This is shown by the cell phone GPS
34.

COVID-19 cases numbers are from Tracking the Coronavirus at U.S. Colleges and Universities, N.Y. Times
(Dec. 11, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/us/covid-college-cases-tracker.html.
Status and student body size are from Here’s Our List of Colleges’ Reopening Models, Chron. Higher
Educ. (Oct. 1, 2020, 2:04 PM), https://www.chronicle.com/article/heres-a-list-of-colleges-plansfor-reopening-in-the-fall/. See also Emma Pettit, Colleges Ask Professors to Return to the Classroom. Their
Answer? That’s ‘Reckless,’ Chron. Higher Educ. (Nov. 12, 2020), https://www.chronicle.com/

article/colleges-ask-professors-to-return-to-the-classroom-their-answer-thats-reckless.

35.

See Danielle Ivory, Robert Gebeloff & Sarah Mervosh, Young People Have Less Covid-19 Risk, but in
College Towns, Deaths Rose Fast, N.Y. Times (Dec. 11, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/12/
us/covid-colleges-nursing-homes.html. But see Benjamin Schmidt, Are College Students Killing Townies?, Chron. Higher Educ. (Dec. 17, 2020), https://www.chronicle.com/article/
are-college-students-killing-townies.
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study36—which discovered a correlation between the arrival of students for fall
semester classroom instruction and the subsequent off-campus outbreaks among
the local populations—as well as the La Crosse genomic sequencing study—which
traced the routes of viral substrains that were introduced into communities by
returning students and ended up in nursing homes.37
Here is another example of political interference—
In Florida, . . . faculty unions at three public universities—the University of
Central Florida, the University of Florida and Florida Atlantic University—are
filing grievances against their institutions regarding in-person instruction. . . .
Tom Auxter, associate professor of philosophy at [the University of] Florida, said
the university appears to be bowing to political pressure from state lawmakers
including . . . governor Ron DeSantis . . . .38

And another—
In March, as the Covid-19 pandemic exploded globally, the Georgia Institute of
Technology ordered an immediate campus shutdown. Classes switched to online
instruction. Students moved out of their dorms. But the University System of
Georgia objected. The state wanted Georgia Tech to suspend in-person classes
36.

The sample covered the period from July 15 to September 13, 2020 and included 779 counties
with one or more college or university campuses. Martin S. Andersen et al., College Openings,
Mobility, and the Incidence of COVID-19, MedRxiv (Sept. 23, 2020), https://www.medrxiv.org/con
tent/10.1101/2020.09.22.20196048v1; Melissa Korn & Brianna Abbott, Reopening Colleges Likely
Fueled Covid-19 Significantly, Study Finds, Wall St. J. (Sept. 22, 2020, 10:52 AM), https://www.wsj.
com/articles/reopening-colleges-likely-fueled-covid-19-significantly-study-finds-11600776001
(The researchers “found little uptick in case counts for those communities where students
moved back to be near campus, but were taking classes online. The biggest surge came near
schools with in-person instruction, with particular spikes in places where students came from
hot-spot zones elsewhere in the country”).

37.

Lu et al., supra note 5; Craig Richmond et al., SARS-CoV-2 Sequencing Reveals Rapid Transmission
from College Student Clusters Resulting in Morbidity and Deaths in Vulnerable Populations, ResearchGate
(Oct. 14, 2020), https://www.researchgate.net/publication/346221324_SARS-CoV-2_sequencing_reveals_rapid_transmission_from_college_student_clusters_resulting_in_morbidity_and_deaths_in_vulnerable_populations. See Francie Diep, Where Campuses Reopened,
Covid-19 Cases Spiked. Where Colleges Went Remote, They Declined, Chron. Higher Educ. (Jan. 8,
2021), https://www.chronicle.com/article/where-campuses-reopened-covid-19-cases-spikedwhere-colleges-went-remote-they-declined, and Danielle Ivory, Robert Gebeloff & Sarah
Mervosh, Young People Have Less Covid-19 Risk, but in College Towns, Deaths Rose Fast, N.Y. Times (Dec.
12, 2020, updated March 2, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/12/us/covid-collegesnursing-homes.html.

38.

Colleen Flaherty, Against Face-to-Face Teaching Mandates, Inside Higher Ed (Nov. 10, 2020), https://
www.insidehighered.com/news/2020/11/10/professors-fight-face-face-spring-teaching-mandates.
In January 2021, the University of Florida briefly installed “what critics called a ‘tattle’ button
on the Gator Safe mobile app [allowing] students to report a ‘course concern’ if their professor
changed a scheduled in-person class to online.” After outraged faculty complaints, “the university
. . . removed the button from the app. Students can still report faculty members who reschedule
a course, but they now must fill out a form to do so.” Michael Vasquez, With Covid Cases High,
U. of Florida Expands In-Person Classes Sixfold, Chron. Higher Educ. (Jan. 19, 2021), https://www.
chronicle.com/article/with-covid-cases-high-u-of-florida-expands-in-person-classes-sixfold
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for only two weeks, delaying a final decision on the rest of the semester. The
university’s president, Ángel Cabrera, backed down . . . .
The state’s higher-education system, with a Board of Regents appointed by
its . . . governor, is noticeably hands-on in making decisions that affect its 26
institutions . . . . Critics fear that Georgia colleges are losing their independence,
which potentially weakens the voice of faculty as well. And in the Covid-19 era,
the stakes have grown higher, because university decisions now have life-ordeath consequences.39

These situations were straightforward and widely reported. But political
influence can be more subtle. In a story titled State Politics Influenced College Reopening
Plans, Data Show, a reporter for Inside Higher Ed quoted a professor of higher
education and administration:
There are a lot of things about relationships between public institutions and
political leaders and pressures that are not totally explicit and not completely
happening in a public space . . . . A lot of the time, I think it’s a complicated
dance where institutional leaders are trying to guess at how their decisions are
going to be interpreted and whether they will be rewarded or penalized for
those decisions.40

Because political interference can fly under the radar, we might never know
the full extent of it.
Political interference on COVID issues is part of a larger picture and can’t
be appreciated without at least a glimpse at that larger picture. An example is
the political interference in Florida that has put the state’s public universities at
risk of becoming unaccredited and their students at risk of becoming ineligible
for federally subsidized student loans.
Florida universities are accredited by the Southern Association of Colleges
and Schools Commission on Colleges (SACSCOC). In May 2021, SACSCOC
sent a letter to the Florida university system’s Board of Governors asking for
information relevant to whether the process of appointing the president of
Florida State University violated SACSCOC conflicts of interest rules.41 And
in November 2021, after University of Florida administrators prohibited three
39.

Michael Vasquez, Georgia’s Top-Down Management of Higher Ed Causes Covid-19 Chaos,
Chron. Higher Educ. (June 30, 2020), https://www.chronicle.com/article/
georgias-top-down-management-of-higher-ed-causes-covid-19-chaos.

40.

Madeline St. Amour, Political Influence on Fall Plans, I nside H igher E d
(Sept.
3,
2020),
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2020/09/03/
state-politics-influenced-college-reopening-plans-data-show.

41.

Eric Kelderman, “A Mandate for Musical Chairs”: Florida Bill Would Require Colleges to Change Accreditors,
Chron. Higher Educ. (Feb. 4, 2022 ), https://www.chronicle.com/article/a-mandate-formusical-chairs-florida-bill-would-require-colleges-to-change-accreditors; Emma Whitford,
Florida Could Make Switching Accreditors Mandatory, Inside Higher Ed (Feb. 11, 2022), https://www.
insidehighered.com/news/2022/02/11/florida-bill-would-require-colleges-change-accreditors.
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professors from testifying in a voting rights lawsuit, SACSCOC sent a letter to
the University of Florida president asking for information relevant to whether
SACSCOC’s rules on academic freedom had been violated.42
The Florida legislature’s reaction was to enact in March 2022 a statute requiring every public university and college in the state to apply for institutional
accreditation from an accreditor other than the current one, which is SACSCOC.43
The statute also created a cause of action through which an accreditor could be
liable for “liquidated damages” to a college or university “negatively impacted
by retaliatory action” by the accreditor.44
It’s hard to imagine any new accreditor willing even to consider a university’s
application for accreditation where a decision on that application could expose
the accreditor to potentially ruinous financial liability. The statute allows a
university to continue with SACSCOC if no new accreditor is willing to grant
accreditation. But SACSCOC itself would be exposed to the same liability
and can on its own decide to withdraw entirely from accrediting state schools
in Florida.
A student is eligible for federally subsidized student loans only if the student
is enrolled in an accredited school.45 If a university becomes unaccredited,
its students become ineligible.46 Federal law limits accreditor-shopping by
universities. Unless a university complies with strict Department of Education
requirements, its students can become ineligible for student loans while the
university seeks a new accreditor even if there’s no period during which the
university is unaccredited.47
42.

Kelderman, supra note 41; Whitford, supra note 41; U. of Florida’s Accreditor Will Investigate
Denial of Professors’ Voting-Rights Testimony, Chron. Higher Educ. (Nov. 1, 2021), https://www.
chronicle.com/article/u-of-floridas-accreditor-will-investigate-denial-of-professors-votingrights-testimony; Lindsay Ellis, After Scathing Criticism, U. of Florida Will Let Professors Testify
Against the State, Chron. Higher Educ. (Nov. 5, 2021), https://www.chronicle.com/article/
after-scathing-criticism-u-of-florida-will-let-professors-testify-against-the-state.

43.

Fla. Stat. § 1008.47(2) (effective: April 19, 2022). The statute does not apply to programmatic
accreditors such as the ABA for law schools. See text at notes 95-101 for the difference between
institutional accreditors such as SACSCOC and programmatic accreditors such as the ABA.

44.

Fla. Stat. § 1008.47(3). A Florida university wouldn’t be able to go straight to court. Federal
law requires that a university agree to arbitration first. 20 U.S.C. § 1099b(e).

45.

20 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(5); 20 U.S.C. § 1099b(j).

46.

Because programmatic accreditors like the ABA are exempt from the Florida statute, a law
school at a Florida public university could continue to be accredited by the ABA even if
the law school’s university loses its accreditation. If that happens, the law school’s students
would remain eligible for federal loans even if other students in the university are not. For
student loan purposes, the law school’s students would be on the same footing as students at
free-standing law schools like Brooklyn and Southwestern, which are not part of a university.

47.

20 U.S.C. § 1099b(h); 34 C.F.R. § 600.11(a).
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IV. Modalities: “In person,” Online, and Simultaneous Hybrid48
In most of the country, genuine “in person” and “in a classroom” teaching
ceased, in a pedagogical sense, in March 2020. Those two terms—“in person”
and “in a classroom”—have been used for either of two reasons, only one of
which is accurate.
In a public health sense, a class is “in person” or “in a classroom” if the teacher
is in the physical presence of at least some students, creating a contagion risk.
This usage is accurate. It also has nothing to do with pedagogy, curriculum,
or method of instruction.
The other usage might be by those who have wanted faculty members to be
physically present in classrooms. If teaching can be described as “in person”
and “in a classroom,” the terms can be used to imply a familiar image—a teacher
and all of a class’s students interacting together in one space, sharing the experience of learning. But in much of the country that did not happen even when a
teacher was in a classroom. In this sense—the pedagogical one—the two terms
have been used inaccurately. Sometimes they have been used by students and
their families who had hoped for classroom-quality learning, had read or heard
the terms being used by universities, and had an inaccurate impression of what
would actually happen during the fall 2020 semester. They had gotten that
impression because the terms were being used by some university administrators
as branding language. The truth is that what faculty were doing was a primitive form of hybrid teaching—some students in the room and others elsewhere,
connected via Zoom.49
Hybrid education is a broad term. It means education that uses both in-class
teaching and online teaching. Before 2020, hybrid typically meant that some
material would be learned in a classroom and that other material would be
learned separately online. In a hybrid degree program, some courses might be
in a classroom and some courses might be online.50 In a hybrid course, all the
students might be in a classroom during part of the course, and all of them
might be online during another part. The course would be structured so that
all students would be in the classroom when in-class teaching would be more
beneficial, and all students would be online when online teaching would be
48.

For the record, I am not an advocate of online education generally, but I taught entirely
online during 2020 and 2021. Some details are in note 121.

49.

Webex might be used instead. But Zoom is more common, and for brevity, I’ll use the word
Zoom to refer to any platform of the type.

50.

At least nine law schools have part-time J.D. programs based on this model and were created
before the pandemic: Dayton, Denver, Loyola (Chicago), Mitchell Hamline, New Hampshire, Seton Hall, Syracuse, Suffolk, and Touro. For a description of the Dayton and New
Hampshire programs as well as the large amount of teaching and student effort involved in
hybrid J.D. programs, the need to ensure that off-tenure-track faculty are treated fairly in
workload distribution, and some of the methods used to require student engagement during
asynchronous segments, see Lilah Burke, Faculty and Pedagogy in the Hybrid J.D., Inside Higher
Ed (Oct. 2, 2019), https://www.insidehighered.com/digital-learning/article/2019/10/02/
how-instructors-have-shaped-curricula-two-hybrid-jd-programs.
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more beneficial. Before 2020, hybrid was not generally understood to mean
teaching two groups of students simultaneously, some in the classroom while
others are online.
Then suddenly, for public health reasons, millions of K-12, undergraduate,
and postgraduate teachers had to start doing exactly that—presenting the same
material both in person and online simultaneously—a modality with no name.
During the pandemic, this has been called hybrid or HyFlex because both
classrooms and the internet are involved. But to use either of these terms is to
confuse what has been happening haphazardly with educational structures that
took many years to design and have well-established track records. Eventually,
the English language will settle on a word or phrase for the name for what
millions of teachers had to do beginning in the fall of 2020. Blended has been
used sometimes as an adjective. But it isn’t a name, and merging it with hybrid
as blended hybrid sounds like applying a kitchen appliance to a teaching method.
Simultaneous hybrid does evoke an accurate image, and I’ll use it here.
If a pure lecture course were taught in simultaneous hybrid—some students
in the room physically and others via Zoom—the teacher would be lecturing to
two passive audiences and need only remember to make sure that the Zoom
students can see whatever the teacher writes on a board. In some undergraduate
courses with large enrollments—courses where students learn only knowledge
and are not learning intellectual and professional skills—pure lecture might be
acceptable pedagogy.
But for more than a hundred years that has not been acceptable in legal
education. Langdell started teaching from a casebook in 1870, and by the early
twentieth century Socratic casebook teaching—interactive teaching—had become
the national norm. Modern law school skills and writing classes are even more
interactive. In-class interaction permeates legal education.
During the pandemic, the word HyFlex has been used inaccurately to refer
to teaching to two audiences simultaneously. Sometimes the word has been
used mistakenly out of sincere misunderstanding. At other times it has been
misused as hype. HyFlex is short for Hybrid Flexible. A course does not become
HyFlex just because a student has the flexibility to decide whether to attend
class physically or via Zoom. There’s a lot more to it than that.
HyFlex is a specific form of hybrid teaching developed by Brian Beatty and
colleagues at San Francisco State University.51 “[S]tudents can take a HyFlex
course in one of three ways: in-person synchronous, online synchronous, and
online asynchronous [moving] back and forth between those modes throughout
the duration of the course as it fits their needs and contexts.”52 EDUCAUSE,
the higher education IT consortium, describes it this way:
51.

Hybrid-Flexible Course Design: Implementing Student-Directed Hybrid Classes (Brian
J. Beatty ed., 2019).

52.

Kevin Gannon, Our HyFlex Experiment: What’s Worked and What Hasn’t, Chron. Higher Educ. (Oct. 26,
2020), https://www.chronicle.com/article/our-hyflex-experiment-whats-worked-and-what-hasnt.
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Each class session and learning activity is offered in-person, synchronously
online, and asynchronously [prerecorded] online. Students can decide—for
each class or activity—how to participate . . . .

. . . The instructor develops the course, tools, and channels and organizes the
curriculum to reflect that structure . . . . All of the educational resources must
be online, and students typically participate in a chat space along with the live
video of the session . . . . Sometimes a teaching assistant or a student in the
class helps moderate the chat or other backchannels . . . . A key differentiator
of HyFlex is the asynchronous option, which often requires significant faculty
preparation to be equivalent to the other learning paths. Simply streaming all F2F
[face-to-face] classes, for instance, does not meet the definition of HyFlex . . . .
Students who must work and/or take care of family can benefit from true
HyFlex course designs because the asynchronous pathway can enable them to
maintain progress toward their academic goals . . . . Meanwhile, HyFlex might
not be the best fit for lab classes, programs that require synchronous participation, or
certain disciplines . . . .53

HyFlex wasn’t designed to teach students how to think like professionals.
It was developed to teach “graduate students in an educational-technology
program,” most of whom were “full-time educational professionals (i.e., they
already had day jobs), and were pursuing graduate work from a variety of
locations and experiences.”54 In other words, HyFlex was created for students
who already are professionals.
In a thoughtful article in the Chronicle of Higher Education, Kevin Gannon, a history professor, describes many of HyFlex’s characteristics—two of
which would cause law faculties to reject it out of hand. One is the enormous
effort needed to create—HyFlex veterans say “build”—a HyFlex course, which
can’t be done in a few weeks: “HyFlex courses are hard to build, and even
harder to teach [and] in a Covid-19 semester, amid all the extra cognitive load
involved for both instructors and students, the resources for doing so may
simply not be available.”55 The other is that HyFlex is inappropriate for any
type of intensively interactive teaching—in a law school or anywhere else. “It’s
no coincidence that faculty members who are finding HyFlex a difficult fit are
those whose classes are either completely or mostly discussion-based . . . .”56
Even in a big-investment form like HyFlex, pedagogical quality goes downhill
fast the moment interactivity begins.
53.

Natalie Milman et al., 7 Things You Should Know About the HyFlex Course Model, Educause (July 7,
2020), https://library.educause.edu/resources/2020/7/7-things-you-should-know-about-thehyflex-course-model (emphasis added).

54.

Gannon, supra note 52.

55.

Id.

56.

Id.
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The widespread teaching that happened in higher education during 2020
and 2021 was not HyFlex. It was instead a primitive form of hybrid with one
distinguishing characteristic: things are simultaneous. Neither of the following
statements about a simultaneous hybrid course is significantly less true than
the other:
A. This is an in-person course in which a portion of the students are online.
B. This is an online course in which a portion of the students are in a classroom.
The proportion of students in the classroom versus those online is not particularly relevant to quality. First, the teacher must accomplish the extraordinary
feat of being equally effective to both groups of students simultaneously because
neither group deserves worse treatment than the other. Second, techniques that
work well for students who are physically present often don’t work well for
students who are online, and vice versa. If a teacher’s effort is divided between
two groups of students using inconsistent teaching techniques, students will
get less regardless of where they are.57
Simultaneous hybrid is neither fully in-person teaching nor fully online
teaching.58 It is a third modality.
V. Governance and Academic Freedom
These are different concepts, and for clarity I must explain the differences.
This article analyzes only faculty governance concerning curriculum and methods of instruction. It does not analyze other governance issues or academic
freedom issues, although academic freedom issues do arise in higher education’s
responses to the pandemic.
Throughout higher education there is an allocation of authority between
faculty and administrators. Faculty generally have primary governance over
academic policy. Administrators primarily govern the practicalities of running a
university. The practicalities can be mundane. Or they can be profound—raising
57.

58.

Some schools put a great deal of effort and ingenuity into reducing simultaneous hybrid’s
disadvantages and getting as much value from it as possible. What those schools accomplished
deserves to be understood and appreciated. I hope it will be through articles and professional
conference presentations. Here I’m describing characteristics of the modality as it would be
experienced in most law schools in typical situations.

See Alison Adams et al., Open Letter from UF Faculty Against the Spring Plan, Ind. Fla. Alligator (Dec.
11, 2020), https://www.alligator.org/article/2020/12/open-letter-from-uf-faculty-against-thespring-plan (citing approximately 200 faculty members: “[T]he reality is that our last-minute,
improvised plan for undergraduate education [in the spring] semester will not provide the best,
or even a sufficient, learning and teaching environment.  . . . It is a last-minute, improvised,
doubling-up of two classes in one, which will create harder learning environments than a
typical face-to-face class or a typical online class”).
		 This may be the general university experience, but there are exceptions. For
an example of getting simultaneous hybrid to work in a Renaissance literature and art
course and an advanced Italian grammar course. Deborah Parker, An Essential Worker,
Inside Higher Ed (Dec. 9, 2020), https://www.insidehighered.com/advice/2020/12/09/
professor-explains-why-she-chose-teach-person-semester-and-how-she-made-it-work.
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money, creating new departments, consolidating old ones, setting a vision for
a university’s future, for example.
Sometimes authority overlaps. A common example is that a faculty body
makes an initial decision to grant tenure to a colleague, but that decision is technically a recommendation because it always needs approval by administrators—a
dean or department chair, a provost, a university president, and ultimately a
governing board. A candidate for tenure always needs both faculty approval
and administrative approval.
A faculty’s governance authority belongs to the faculty as a group. But a
faculty member’s academic freedom is individual and is divided into four categories.59 One is the freedom to teach in the way the faculty member thinks best.
The second is freedom to investigate and report the results, which academics
often think of as freedom to research and publish, although that’s an example
rather than a definition. The third, sometimes called freedom of extramural
communication,60 is the freedom to speak and write for audiences outside the
university without interference by the university. The fourth, sometimes called
freedom of intramural communication,61 is the freedom to speak and write on
internal university affairs, such as while participating in governance.
An example will illustrate where some of the dividing lines are.62 In a law
school, the faculty, exercising its governance authority, defines a course and puts
it into the curriculum. If you teach the course, you must teach it as the faculty
has defined it. For example, if you teach Contracts, and if at your school the
official course description summarizes what the faculty thinks it approved, you
are required to teach it as described.63 You are not free to omit a core contract
concept like consideration even if you find its issues tedious. Unless your faculty has authorized teaching Contracts partially online (simultaneous hybrid)
or fully online, you are not free to switch to Zoom whenever you’d like. The
default everywhere is that all students must be in the room unless a faculty has
authorized another modality.
For a moment let’s assume that we are in normal times and nobody is thinking about online teaching. Your dean has authority to assign you to teach the
59.

On academic freedom generally, see Matthew W. Finkin & Robert C. Post, For the Common Good: Principles of American Academic Freedom (2009); Richard Hofstadter &
William P. Metzger, The Development of Academic Freedom in the United States (1955).
For a careful analysis of the academic freedom case law by a large university’s general counsel,
see Frederick P. Schaffer, A Guide to Academic Freedom, 0 J. Collective Bargaining Acad. (2014),
https://thekeep.eiu.edu/jcba/vol0/iss9/12/.

60.

Finkin & Post, supra note 59, at 127.

61.

Finkin & Post, supra note 59, at 113.

62.

For a less concrete discussion, see Am. Ass’n of Univ. Professors, On the Relation
of Faculty Governance to Academic Freedom (1994), https://www.aaup.org/report/
relationship-faculty-governance-academic-freedom.

63.

See, e.g., Riggin v. Bd. of Trs., 489 N.E.2d 616 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986) (describing how a tenured
faculty member fired for, among other offenses, failing to cover material listed in the school’s
official course description).
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course even if you’d rather not; to schedule it at 8:00 a.m. even if you’re not
a morning person; and to schedule you into a room you despise. These are
administrative practicalities and have nothing to do with the quality of education or academic policy. If you don’t teach that course at that time and place,
you commit insubordination.64
Although you must teach the course as the faculty has defined it and at the
time and place the administration has specified, you have academic freedom
otherwise to teach as you wish.65 During the scheduled class time, you own
the room. You can teach the subject in whatever way you think best as long
you teach competently,66 do nothing illegal, and don’t abuse your students’
academic freedom to learn.67
64.

For examples of tenured faculty members fired for insubordination, see Branham v. Thomas
M. Cooley Law Sch., 689 F.3d 558 (6th Cir. 2012) (refusing to teach an assigned course);
Peterson v. N.D. Univ. Sys., 678 N.W.2d 163 (N.D. 2004) (detailing among other offenses,
ending a class a month before the semester ended); Riggin v. Bd. of Trs., 489 N.E.2d 616
(Ind. Ct. App. 1986) (detailing among other offenses, “frequently fail[ing] to meet classes as
scheduled at the prescribed hour or for the prescribed length of time”).

65.

See, e.g., Am. Ass’n of Univ. Professors, Statement on the Freedom to Teach (Nov. 7, 2013), https://www.
aaup.org/news/statement-freedom-teach#.YqDAxqjMKUn; Am. Ass’n of Univ. Professors,
Freedom in the Classroom (2007), https://www.aaup.org/report/freedom-classroom.

66.

See, e.g., these cases where tenured faculty members were fired: Agarwal v. Regents of the
Univ. Minn., 788 F.2d 504, 506 (8th Cir. 1986) (“incompetent as a teacher, frequently harassing students,” etc.); King v. Univ. Minn., 774 F.2d 224, 225 (8th Cir. 1985) (“poor teaching
performance, excessive unexcused absences from class, . . . low enrollment in his classes”);
Potemra v. Ping, 462 F. Supp. 328, 330–31 (S.D. Ohio 1978) (detailing how faculty member
was not responding to questions in class, criticizing students for asking questions, behaving
belligerently to students, giving failing grades vindictively); Jawa v. Fayetteville State Univ.,
426 F. Supp. 218, 224 (E.D. N.C. 1976) (“a poor teacher . . . apparently unwilling to prepare
for class; . . . difficulty interacting with [and] little interest in his students; . . . failed to keep
office hours and to advise properly his students”); Peterson v. N.D. Univ. Sys., 678 N.W.2d
163 (N.D. 2004) (revealing confidential information about a student to other students, ending
a class a month before the semester ended, and ignoring student questions and individual
student requests for assistance); Riggin v. Bd. of Trs., 489 N.E.2d 616 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986)
(teaching without adequate preparation, habitually discussing irrelevant material in class,
failing to cover material listed in the school’s official course description, canceling classes,
and not keeping regular office hours).

67.

Students have academic freedom, too. Academic freedom came into American higher education
in the late 19th and early 20th centuries when our universities were modeling themselves on
German universities, where academic freedom was recognized and protected. An American
faculty member’s academic freedom began as the German Lehrfreiheit, the teacher’s freedom
“to examine bodies of evidence and to report his findings in lecture or published form,” or
in other words “freedom of teaching and freedom of inquiry.” Hofstadter & Metzger, supra
note 59, at 386–87; Finkin & Post, supra note 59, at 79. German universities also recognized
Lernfreiheit — the student’s academic freedom to learn in the student’s own way. Id.; Hofstadter
& Metzge, supra note 59, at 386–87. The German concept was much broader than a freedom
to learn without hindrance or abuse. Although in the U.S. neither academics nor judges are
in the habit of using the phrase students’ academic freedom, the concept is deeply imbedded in our
expectations of colleagues and in the law of higher education, as the cases in the preceding
footnote illustrate.
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This example involves only one of the four academic freedoms. The other
three—freedom to investigate and report results, freedom to speak and write
for an external audience, and freedom to speak and write internally while
participating in governance—might be more likely to lead to disputes during a
pandemic. But pandemic academic freedom issues would need exploration in
depth elsewhere. Here I’m only explaining what governance is and the difference between governance issues and academic freedom issues.
VI. Some Terms of Art—and What They Really Mean
Sometimes conversations about governance and academic freedom can
seem like the scene in The Princess Bride where, for the nth time, Vizzini exclaims
“Inconceivable!” and Inigo Montoya, in puzzlement, says “You keep using
that word. I do not think it means what you think it means.” Below are some
terms that are sometimes spoken and written in universities without a full
understanding of their meaning and in ways that imply that faculties have less
authority than they actually do.
A. “Shared Governance”
Sometimes the term shared governance is used, perhaps with a hint of dismissiveness, as though administrators have real control over governance but out
of noblesse oblige share some of it with faculty, in form though not really in
substance. That is not what shared governance means.
Governance, wrote William G. Bowen and Eugene M. Tobin, is “simply the
location and exercise of authority.”68 They added that governance “is far from
a static concept” and that “many intelligent people in the academy know very
little about governance.”69 During the pandemic, a number of law faculties
might not have considered the full extent of their governance authority, which
was often larger than they realized.
In 2003 the Center for Higher Education Policy Analysis, which is now the
Pullias Center for Higher Education at the University of Southern California,
surveyed 1610 administrators and 400 faculty members at a wide range of colleges
and universities.70 The 400 faculty members were all faculty senate presidents
or other faculty with experience in governance issues. The administrators were
provosts and academic vice presidents (411 respondents) and department chairs
(1199). (The center characterized the 1199 department chairs as “faculty,” but
that’s not accurate. A department chair is an administrator similar to a law school
dean. Although neither a chair nor a dean is a university-wide administrator,
both are subdivision administrators who answer to university administrators.)
68.

William G. Bowen & Eugene M. Tobin, Locus of Authority ix (2015). Bowen is a former
president of Princeton University, and Tobin is a former president of Hamilton College.

69.

Id.

70.

William G. Tierney & James T. Minor, Center for Higher Education Policy Analysis,
Challenges for Governance: A National Report (2003), https://pullias.usc.edu/download/
challenges-for-governance-a-national-report/.
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Even in this administrator-heavy population, only about a quarter (27%)
thought that shared governance is hierarchical and that the real “authority
remains with the senior administration and the board of trustees,” the only
sharing being informational in that a faculty’s role is to be informed of the
decisions being made and free to express views.
About half the respondents (47%) thought that shared governance means
“fully collaborative decision-making”—a “collegial model”—in which “faculty
and administration make decisions jointly and consensus is the goal.”
Another quarter (26%) thought that shared governance means a distribution
of authority in which the “faculty have a right to make decisions in certain areas,
and the administration and [governing] board in others.” In a formal sense,
this is the model of shared governance required by the ABA Standards and the
AALS Bylaws where law schools are concerned.
That is not to say that three-quarters of the respondents were wrong about
their universities’ law schools. Actually, three-quarters of them might have
been right. The “fully collaborative decision-making” model with jointly made
decisions aimed at consensus (47%) by definition involves the faculty’s deferring to administrators’ expertise in some areas and administrators’ deferring to
faculty expertise in others. That deference would make the “fully collaborative
decision-making” model an emotionally intelligent way of accomplishing the
substance of what the ABA and AALS formally require.
Other surveys were conducted in 2001 by Gerald Kaplan and in 2007 by
William Cummings and Martin Finkelstein.71 The results were approximately
consistent with the 2003 Center for Higher Education Policy Analysis survey.
The nationally authoritative document on shared governance—the 1966
Statement on Government of Colleges and Universities72—is consistent with
both the collaborative-decision-making and distribution-of-authority models
of shared governance. It specifically rejects the hierarchical model. The 1966
Statement is treated as representing a consensus in higher education because it
was the product of consultation among the American Association of University
Professors (the AAUP), the American Council on Education (the ACE), and
the Association of Governing Boards of Universities and Colleges (the AGB).73
Because the AAUP was and still is the most committed of the three organizations, the document is often called the 1966 AAUP Statement on Government.
Beginning in the 1990s, it became no longer rare for university presidents
to come from backgrounds other than academia. University governing boards
began to include members who assume their roles to be like directors on the
boards of corporations, and the AGB became somewhat ambivalent about
71.

Larry G. Gerber, The Rise and Decline of Faculty Governance: Professionalization
and the Modern American University 158–164 (2014).

72.

Am. Ass’n of Univ. Professors, Statement on Government of Colleges and Universities
(1966), https://www.aaup.org/report/statement-government-colleges-and-universities.

73.

Gerber, supra note 71, at 82, 95–100.
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the 1966 Statement.74 But the AGB continues to treat the 1966 Statement as
authoritative. In 2017, it issued a Board of Directors’ Statement on Shared
Governance, which expresses a commitment to shared governance while also
describing disappointments expressed by individual board members who seem
not to have realized before going on university boards how much of their own
personal effort and patience shared governance would require. Their surprise
might be predictable. Corporate boards of directors are often under the impression that they don’t share governance with employees.
In its final pages, the 2017 AGB Statement lists ten “Threshold Conditions
for High-functioning Shared Governance.” Here is the first one: “A shared
commitment on the part of faculty, administration, and board members to the
principles of shared governance, and a current, shared understanding among
faculty, board, and president of what shared governance actually is and how
it operates/functions/works in their institution.” To that the AGB added this
footnote: “Specific reference to the AAUP Statement on Government of Colleges and Universities in the institution’s governing documents is an important
foundation for this shared commitment.”75
Although college and university faculty authority might have shrunk on some
types of issues, it has grown over the last 50 years regarding curriculum. The
AAUP surveyed colleges and universities in 1971, 2001, and 202176 on several
categories of governance issues, among them “institutional curriculum”77 and
“program curriculum.”78 The results are in Tables 6 and 7.
Table 6
Institutional Curriculum Authority
Faculty
dominance or
primacy

Joint
Action/Authority

Administrative
dominance, primacy,
discussion, or consultation

1971

41.1 %

38.7 %

20.2 %

2001

62.8 %

30.5 %

6.6 %

2021

60.1 %

25.5 %

14.4 %

74.

Id. at 155–58.

75.

Association of Governing Boards of Universities and Colleges, AGB Board of
Directors’ Statement on Shared Governance 12 (2017), https://agb.org/wp-content/
uploads/2019/01/2017_statement_sharedgovernance.pdf.

76.

The 2021 AAUP Shared Governance Survey: Findings on Faculty Roles by Decision-Making Areas, Bull. of
the AAUP, July 2021, at 82, 93, https://www.aaup.org/sites/default/files/2021-AAUP-SharedGovernance-Survey-Findings-on-Faculty-Roles.pdf.

77.

“[G]eneral education, distribution requirements, minimum/maximum requirements in major,
etc.” Id. at 84.

78.

“[A]pproval of individual courses and major/minor requirements.” Id.
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At doctoral-degree granting universities, the 2021 institutional curriculum
authority results were somewhat different from colleges and universities in
general (Table 6): 54% faculty dominance or primary; 28.5% joint; and 17.5%
administrative. There was no significant difference among types of colleges and
universities regarding program curriculum authority (Table 7).79
Table 7
Program Curriculum Authority
Faculty
dominance or
primacy

Joint
Action/Authority

Administrative
dominance, primacy,
discussion, or consultation

1971

43.4 %

35.1 %

21.6 %

2001

54.2 %

38.8 %

9.0 %

2021

76.0 %

18.4 %

5.6 %

B. “A University’s Academic Freedom” and “Institutional Academic Freedom”
It is not true that a university has academic freedom that outranks the academic
freedom of individual faculty members. The phrases a university’s academic freedom
and institutional academic freedom have a precise legal meaning that has nothing to
do with a university’s relationship with its faculty. The meaning instead concerns
a university’s relationship with the outside world.
The two phrases refer to a university’s institutional autonomy, as in this oftquoted sentence from Justice Powell’s 1978 opinion in Regents of the University of
California v. Bakke, an affirmative action case: “The freedom of a university to make
its own judgments as to education includes the selection of its student body.”80
And this more recent one from McAdams v. Marquette University: “A university’s
academic freedom is a shield against governmental interference . . . .”81 And,
as Judge Posner put it in Piarowski v. Illinois Community College Dist. 515, the term
academic freedom “is used to denote both the freedom of the academy to pursue
its ends without interference from the government . . . and the freedom of the
individual teacher (or in some versions—indeed in most cases—the student) to
pursue his ends without interference from the academy . . . .”82
C. “Garcetti”
The Supreme Court decision in Garcetti v. Ceballos83 does not mean that faculty
in public universities have no protection against retaliation for what they say
79.

Id. At 89-90.

80.

438 U.S. 265, 312.

81.

914 N.W.2d 708, 737 (Wis. 2018).

82.

759 F.2d 625, 629 (7th Cir. 1985).

83.

547 U.S. 410 (2006).
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when participating in governance. In both public and private universities,
participating in governance is protected as a form of academic freedom.84
Gil Garcetti85 was the district attorney for Los Angeles County when Richard
Ceballos, a deputy district attorney, disagreed with some prosecutorial decisions
and expressed his disagreement, to the annoyance of supervisors. Afterward
Ceballos was reassigned unfavorably and denied a promotion. Relying on
Pickering v. Board of Education, a 1968 Supreme Court case,86 he sued, alleging a
violation of his First Amendment rights. When Garcetti v. Ceballos reached the
Supreme Court in 2006, the Court carved out an exception to the Pickering rule
for job-related speech.
Both Pickering and Ceballos had complained about matters the public would
care about. Pickering, a high school teacher, had complained publicly, in a letter
to a newspaper, that his employer, a school board, had handled tax money badly.
Ceballos had complained internally that a prosecution had been mishandled. It
wasn’t part of Pickering’s job to comment on how tax money was spent. But it
was part of Ceballos’s job, as a deputy with some supervisory responsibilities,
to comment on certain types of prosecutorial decisions made by others in the
same office. The Court held that for that reason Ceballos’s complaints were not
protected by the First Amendment. “We hold that when public employees make
statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as
citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate
their communications from employer discipline.”87 In dissent, Justice Souter
wrote: “I have to hope that today’s majority does not mean to imperil First
Amendment protection of academic freedom in public colleges and universities,
whose teachers necessarily speak and write ‘pursuant to . . . official duties.’”88
The Court’s opinion was written by Justice Kennedy, who for twenty-three
years, while in private practice and then while on the Ninth Circuit bench, had
taught as an adjunct professor at McGeorge School of Law in Sacramento.
Justice Kennedy inserted this comment into the Court’s opinion: “Justice Souter
suggests today’s decision may have important ramifications for academic freedom, at least as a constitutional value . . . . We need not, and . . . do not, decide
whether the analysis we conduct today would apply in the same manner to a
case involving speech related to scholarship or teaching,”89 which are among
the duties of public university faculties.
Since then, lower courts have declined to hold that Garcetti strips First Amendment protection from scholarship or teaching done by faculty in public univer84.

See note 108, infra and accompanying text on how academic freedom is protected in law
schools.

85.

Gil Garcetti has not been the mayor of Los Angeles. That is Eric Garcetti, Gil’s son.

86.

391 U.S. 563.

87.

Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006).

88.

Id. at 438.

89.

Id. at 425.
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sities.90 But some courts have held that intramural academic speech, including
speech on governance issues, is no longer protected by the First Amendment.91
Garcetti arguably removed First Amendment protection from intramural
speech, including speech while participating in governance.92 Private university
faculty never had that protection in the first place, because retaliation by private
university administrators is not state action. Garcetti did no more than put public
and private university faculty on the same footing.
VII. ABA Standards and AALS Bylaws
The ABA Standards for Approval of Law Schools93 and the AALS Bylaws94
are separate sets of requirements. Nearly all law schools must satisfy both ABA
accreditation allows a law school’s graduates to sit for bar exams. An accredited
school is expected to comply with the ABA Standards. An AALS member school
is expected to comply with the AALS Bylaws and can be sanctioned under
Bylaw 7-1 for noncompliance with the requirements of membership, which are
in the Bylaws’ Article 6.
An ABA accreditation site inspection is also an AALS membership site
inspection. The ABA inspection team as a whole reports to the ABA on facts
relevant to whether the school is in compliance with the ABA accreditation
standards. The AALS designates one member of the ABA team to be the AALS
reporter charged with submitting a similar report to the AALS on compliance
with AALS requirements.
Governance and academic freedom are regulated by ABA Standards and
by AALS Bylaws in ways that are specific to law schools. The governance
requirements in law schools are not identical to those that apply elsewhere in a
university. Sometimes university administrators are not especially aware of this,
which is understandable, because they are responsible for large organizations
in many of which the law school is a small part. But not being fully aware of
something doesn’t make it not true.
Less than full awareness at the university level might be attributable to the
way universities and parts of universities are separately accredited. A univer90.

See, e.g., Adams v. Trs. Univ. N.C.–Wilmington, 640 F.3d 550 (4th Cir. 2011); Demers v. Austin,
746 F.3d 402 (9th Cir. 2014).

91.

At the appellate level, see Abcarian v. McDonald, 617 F.3d 931 (7th Cir. 2010); Gorum v. Sessoms, 561 F.3d 179 (3d Cir. 2009); Renken v. Gregory, 541 F.3d 769 (7th Cir. 2008); Savage v.
Gee, 665 F.3d 732 (6th Cir. 2012).

92.

Ellen M. Babbitt et al., “Shared” Governance? New Pressure Points in the Faculty/Institutional Relationship,
41 J. Coll. & Univ. L. 93, 99–101 (2015).

93.

Am. Bar Ass’n, 2021-2022 Standards and Rules of Procedure for Approval of Law Schools
(2021), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/legal_education/resources/standards/.

94.

Ass’n Am, L. Schs., Bylaws (2022), https://www.aals.org/about/handbook/bylaws/.

Violations During the Pandemic of Law School Faculties’ Authority

445

sity as a whole is accredited by one of the six regional accreditors.95 This is
called institutional accreditation. Professional schools are separately subject to
programmatic accreditation—law schools by the ABA, medical schools by the
Liaison Committee on Medical Education (LCME),96 architecture schools
and departments by the National Architectural Accrediting Board (NAAB),97
and so on. A university needs institutional accreditation. A professional school
separately needs programmatic accreditation.98 Unless a medical school has
LCME accreditation, its graduates cannot be licensed to practice medicine.
Unless an architecture school has NAAB accreditation, its graduates cannot
become licensed architects. And unless a law school has ABA accreditation, its
graduates, with few exceptions, cannot be admitted to the bar.
University administrators are well aware of the university-wide accreditation
standards enforced by their university’s regional institutional accreditor. But
many are much less aware of a professional school’s accreditation standards,
which are specialized, often highly detailed, and specific to only one part of
a university. A mid-sized university might include two or three dozen schools
or departments accredited by different programmatic accreditors99 while other
parts of the university need no programmatic accreditation at all.
A law school dean might know a lot about the ABA Standards but little, if
anything, about the standards enforced by the university’s regional accreditor.
A university president might know a lot about the university’s regional accreditor’s standards but little, if anything about the ABA Standards that govern the
law school.
The ABA Standards include unusually strong governance requirements—much
stronger than the requirements of any of the regional institutional accreditors. In
95.

See Paul L. Gaston, Higher Education Accreditation: How It’s Changing, Why It
Must 111-38 (2014). The six regional institutional accreditors are the Higher Learning Commission, https://www.hlcommission.org/Policies/criteria-and-core-components.html; the
Middle States Commission on Higher Education, https://www.msche.org/standards/; the
New England Association of Schools and Colleges, https://www.neasc.org/overview/faq; the
Northwest Commission on Colleges and Universities, https://www.nwccu.org/accreditation/
standards-policies/standards/; the Southern Association of Colleges and Schools Commission
on Colleges, https://sacscoc.org/accrediting-standards/; and the WASC Senior Colleges and
University Commission, https://www.wscuc.org/resources/handbook-accreditation-2013/tablecontents. There is a seventh regional institutional accreditor—the Accrediting Commission for
Community and Junior Colleges of the Western Association of Schools and Colleges—but
it’s irrelevant to universities with law schools.

96.

Liaison Committee on Medical Education, Standards, Publications, & Notification Forms (2022),
https://lcme.org/publications/.

97.

National Architectural Accrediting Board, 2020 Conditions and Procedures (2020), https://www.
naab.org/accreditation/conditions-and-procedures/.

98.

For the history of programmatic accreditation, sometimes called specialized accreditation,
see Gaston, supra note 95, at 19-20 and 161-163.

99.

For example, Northern Kentucky University has units answerable to 24 different programmatic accreditors, and the University of Cincinnati has units answerable to 24 programmatic
accreditors, Gaston, supra note 95, at 154.
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the past, the difference has created few issues. University administrators usually
have better things to do than interfere with the way law students are taught. But
at some universities, that has not been true during the COVID-19 pandemic.
Law schools and medical schools are also, as schools, members of organizations specific to their fields. Medical schools are members of the Association
of American Medical Colleges.100 Nearly all ABA-accredited law schools are
members of the Association of American Law Schools.101 The AALS Bylaws
include unusually strong requirements on law school governance.
VIII. A Law School’s Authority over Methods of Instruction
(ABA Standards and AALS Bylaws)
Under both the ABA Standards102 and the AALS Bylaws,103 a university
does not have primary authority over a law school’s curriculum. The AALS
requirements are explained a few paragraphs hence. The ABA requirements
are explained here.
Under ABA Standard 201(a),
[t]he dean and the faculty shall have the primary responsibility and authority
for planning, implementing, and administering the program of legal education of the law school, including curriculum, methods of instruction and evaluation,
admissions policies and procedures, and academic standards.104
100. AAMC, Institutional Membership (2022), https://www.aamc.org/who-we-are/institutional-membership.
101. The Association of American Law Schools, Member Schools (2022), https://www.aals.org/
member-schools/.
102. Am. Bar Ass’n, 2021-2022 Standards and Rules of Procedure for Approval of Law Schools
(2021), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/legal_education/resources/standards/.
103. Ass’n Am, L. Schs., Bylaws (2022), https://www.aals.org/about/handbook/bylaws/.
104. Am. Bar Ass’n, 2021-2022 Standards and Rules of Procedure for Approval of Law
Schools 201(a) (2021), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/legal_education/resources/
standards/ (emphasis added). This is the Standards’ plain wording and plain meaning. The
ABA does not, however, make a law school’s site inspection reports available to the public,
and it is thus difficult to pin down exactly how the ABA enforces that plain wording and
plain meaning.
		
Architecture’s accreditor, the National Architectural Accrediting Board, does exactly
the opposite. All its Visiting Team Reports are on the NAAB website at https://www.naab.
org/accredited-programs/visiting-team-reports/. There you can read, for example, the 2021
report in which the NAAB found that the Cornell University Department of Architecture
failed to satisfy five of the NAAB Conditions. The report identifies the Conditions and
explains how the school didn’t satisfy them. You can also read the 2021 report in which the
Columbia University Graduate School of Architecture, Planning and Preservation failed to
satisfy four of the NAAB Conditions. The report explains why and how. And you can read
the 2018 Harvard University Graduate School of Design site visit report, which found that
the school did nicely but still failed to satisfy one of the NAAB Conditions.
		
Medical schools are accredited by the Liaison Committee on Medical Education. The
LCME doesn’t treat its inspection reports as public documents, but the content seems to be
accessible to researchers. For examples, see Dan Hunt et al., The Variables That Lead to Severe Action
Decisions by the Liaison Committee on Medical Education, 91 Acad. Med. 87 (2016), and Dan Hunt et al.,
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The ABA’s curricular requirements are in the Standards’ Chapter 3, where
many sentences begin “A law school shall” or “A law school may.”
ABA Standard 201(d) requires that—
[t]he policies of a university that are applicable to a law school shall be consistent with the Standards. The law school shall have separate policies where
necessary to ensure compliance with the Standards.

Thus under 201(d), a law school is out of compliance if its university does
not respect the school’s “authority” to determine, under 201(a), “curriculum
[and] methods of instruction and evaluation.”105
IX. A Law Faculty’s Authority over Methods of Instruction
(AALS Bylaws)
The ABA Standards don’t settle who in a law school makes these decisions.
In Standard 201(a), quoted above, the dean and the faculty are both subjects
of the sentence. The list includes matters that are plainly administrative, such
as admissions procedures, and matters that are plainly pedagogical.
But AALS Bylaw § 6-5(a) does settle the matter by vesting curricular and
modality jurisdiction in the faculty:
In keeping with the principles of shared governance of the American Association of University Professors, a member school shall vest in the faculty primary
responsibility for determining academic policy.106

The incorporation by reference is to the 1966 Statement on Government
of Colleges and Universities, which is often called the AAUP Statement on
Government, and where these are the most relevant sentences:
When an educational goal has been established, it becomes the responsibility
primarily of the faculty to determine the appropriate curriculum and procedures
of student instruction . . . .
The faculty has primary responsibility for such fundamental areas as curriculum,
subject matter and methods of instruction, research, faculty status, and those
aspects of student life which relate to the educational process.107

Through the cross-reference, the phrase “academic policy” in AALS Bylaw
§ 6-5(a) means everything about academic policy listed in the AAUP Statement
The Unintended Consequences of Clarity: Reviewing the Actions of the Liaison Committee on Medical Education
Before and After the Reformatting of Accreditation Standards, 87 Acad. Med. 560 (2012). Researchers
do not have access to ABA site inspection reports.
105. Id.
106. Ass’n Am. L. Schs., Bylaws (2022), https://www.aals.org/about/handbook/bylaws/.
107. Am. Ass’n of Univ. Professors, Statement on Government of Colleges and Universities
(1966), https://www.aaup.org/report/statement-government-colleges-and-universities.
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on Government. Even in a university where the AAUP Statement on Government
has been treated as exhortatory,108 it is mandatory in the law school because it
is incorporated by reference into the AALS Bylaws.
In the AAUP Statement on Government, after the second of the two sentences
block-quoted above, is another sentence, which begins (italics added) “On
these matters the power of review or final decision lodged in the governing board or
delegated by it to the president should be exercised adversely only in exceptional
circumstances and for reasons communicated to the faculty.” This sentence does not alter
the analysis here. There are two reasons.
First, exceptional means exceptional. It doesn’t mean something about which
administrators feel strongly. The COVID-19 pandemic might be an exceptional
event. But nothing about a pandemic prevents a law faculty from making its
own teaching modality decisions—which is proved by the fact that 70% of the
faculties in Table 3 and Appendix B did exactly that. It is also proved by the
additional facts that administrators’ fears about enrollment were exaggerated
concerning undergraduate departments and are irrelevant to law schools, both
of which are explained in detail in this article’s Part III.
Second, a university administrator has only the “power of review or final
decision.”109 That means power to review and confirm or reverse a decision that
108. The 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure is mandatory throughout
a university because nearly all universities have adopted it as policy, and it is typically part of
a teacher’s employment contract just as faculty policies and manuals are. On the contractual
relevance of the 1940 Statement, see, e.g., Krotkoff v. Goucher Coll., 585 F.2d 675, 680 (4th
Cir. 1978) (“The Krotkoff-Goucher contract must be interpreted consistently with the understanding of the national academic community about tenure and financial exigency”). On
faculty policies and manuals, see, e.g., Saha v. Geo. Wash. Univ., 577 F. Supp. 2d 439, 442 (D.D.C.
2008) (“Plaintiff’s contractual relationship with the University appears to consist of only two
documents: the Faculty Code and the Faculty Handbook”). In both respects, see cases cited
by Philip Lee, Academic Freedom at American Universities: Constitutional Rights,
Professional Norms, and Contractual Duties 122–123 (2014) and J. Royce Fichtner &
Lou Ann Simpson, Trimming the Deadwood: Removing Tenured Faculty for Cause, 41 J. Coll. & Univ.
L. 25, 28-30 (2015).
		
In law schools, the 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure is
mandatory for an additional reason. ABA Standard 405(b) & Appendix 1 requires that a law
school’s faculty have the academic freedom protections of the 1940 Statement or an equivalent.
Am. Bar Ass’n, 2021-2022 Standards and Rules of Procedure for Approval of Law Schools,
Appendix 1: Statement on Academic Freedom and Tenure (2021), https://www.americanbar.
org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_education_and_admissions_to_the_bar/
standards/2021-2022/2021-2022-aba-standards-and-rules-of-procedure-appendices.pdf. Law
schools satisfy 405(b) through the 1940 Statement because their universities have already
adopted it as binding policy.
109. Parallel language is in the 1994 AAUP Statement on the Relationship of Faculty Governance to Academic Freedom. Am. Ass’n of Univ. Professors, On the Relationship
of Faculty Governance to Academic Freedom (1994), https://www.aaup.org/report/
relationship-faculty-governance-academic-freedom.
Since such decisions as those involving choice of method of instruction, subject matter
to be taught, policies for admitting students, standards of student competence in a discipline, the maintenance of a suitable environment for learning, and standards of faculty
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a faculty has already made. It is not administrative power to make the initial and
only decision and force it on a law faculty that hasn’t had an opportunity to
decide anything.
The word curriculum and the phrase methods of instruction occur together in the
ABA Standards and, through the AAUP cross-reference, in the AALS Bylaws.
They aren’t separate concepts. Modality decisions are inseparable from curricular content decisions.110
A subject matter course is added to the curriculum specifically as a casebook
course or as a seminar. A skills course is added to the curriculum to be taught
specifically in a simulation modality or specifically as a clinic. By default, a
course is adopted to be taught in person unless a faculty makes a specific decision to authorize it through a different modality. These procedures are close to
universal in law schools.
X. AAUP Investigations of University-Wide Governance
Violations During the Pandemic
The AAUP issued a Guidance for Campus Operation During the Pandemic
(2020),111 in which these sentences appear:
In response to growing concern over unilateral actions taken by governing
boards and administrations during the COVID-19 pandemic, the AAUP affirms
that the fundamental principles and standards of academic governance remain
applicable even in the current crisis.
competence bear directly on the teaching and research conducted in the institution, the
faculty should have primary authority over decisions about such matters—that is, the
administration should “concur with the faculty judgment except in rare instances and
for compelling reasons which should be stated in detail.”
The words inside quotation marks are from the Statement on Government’s section on faculty
status decisions.
110. In legal education, one of the earliest jurisdictional issues over modality occurred in 1870
after Christopher Columbus Langdell walked into his Harvard Contracts class and broke
precedent by asking incessant questions and declining to lecture. All but seven of the students
stopped coming to class. The rest complained bitterly, as did alumni. The president of the
university, Charles Eliot, met with the students, heard them out, and told them to go back
to the law school and learn (Kimball’s book suggests that Eliot trusted Langdell’s methods
because of the students’ approval, not despite their disapproval). Eliot felt that Langdell knew
more than he did about how to teach law. There were no ABA accreditation standards, and
the AALS did not yet exist. During the following decades, Langdell so often asked students
“Could you suggest a reason?” that the question became his trademark, and he asked it in
a way that made many students deeply loyal to him. Robert Stevens, Law School: Legal
Education in America from the 1850s to the 1980s, at 36, 52–55 (1983); Bruce A. Kimball,
The Inception of Modern Professional Education: C.C. Langdell, 1826-1906, at 141–146
(2009); Samuel L. Batchelder, Christopher C. Langdell, 18 Green Bag 437 (1906); William
Schofield, Christopher Columbus Langdell, 55 Amer. L. Reg. 273 (1907).
111.

Am. Ass’n of Univ. Professors, Pandemic Resources: Guidance for Campus Operation (May 5, 2020), https://
www.aaup.org/issues/covid-19-pandemic/pandemic-resources-guidance-campus-operation.
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Some institutions have moved to a blended instructional model for the 2020–21
academic year. The appropriate faculty governance body and, when applicable,
the faculty union should have primary responsibility for determining institutional
policies and practices around this form of instruction . . . .

The AAUP also issued Principles and Standards for the COVID-19 Crisis
(2020),112 in which this appears:
Under the Statement on Government, decisions related to canceling classes,
holding them online, altering the academic calendar, replacing letter grades
with pass-fail or incomplete designations, or canceling final exams and papers
fall within the faculty’s area of primary responsibility. Even in areas where the
faculty does not exercise primary authority—such as budgetary matters and
long-range planning—the faculty still has the right, under principles of shared
governance, to expect meaningful participation in the decision-making process.
None of these decisions should be made unilaterally by administrations or
governing boards.
The COVID-19 pandemic should not become the occasion for administrations
to circumvent widely accepted principles of academic governance, as some
faculty members have reported has happened at their institutions.

In June 2020, the AAUP Committee on College and University Governance
issued Principles of Academic Governance during the COVID-19 Pandemic,113
in which this appears:
Under the [1966] Statement on Government, decisions to revise (even if only
temporarily) tenure and promotion procedures and standards, to elect a preferred method of delivering courses, or to replace letter grades with pass-fail or
incomplete designations fall within the faculty’s area of primary responsibility.
Even in areas in which the faculty does not exercise primary authority—such
as whether and how to reopen campus, budgetary matters, and long-range
planning—the faculty still has the right, under widely observed principles of
academic governance, to participate meaningfully. No important institutional
decision should be made unilaterally by administrations or governing boards.

In September 2020, the AAUP opened an investigation into seven (later eight)
colleges and universities over alleged violations of basic governance principles
112. Am. Ass’n of Univ. Professors, Pandemic Resources: FAQs on AAUP Principles and Standards, (April
1, 2020), https://www.aaup.org/issues/covid-19-pandemic/pandemic-resources-faqs-aaupprinciples-and-standards. On March 10, 2020, when campuses were just beginning to close,
the AAUP issued a Statement on COVID-19 and the Faculty Role in Decision-Making,
which was quickly overtaken by subsequent events in March and April. Am. Ass’n of Univ.
Professors, Statement on COVID-19 and the Faculty Role in Decision-Making (March 10, 2020), https://
www.aaup.org/news/statement-covid-19-and-faculty-role-decision-making#.X8MoGbN7mcx.
113.

Am. Ass’n of Univ. Professors, Principles of Academic Governance During the COVID-19 Pandemic
(June 28, 2020), https://www.aaup.org/news/principles-academic-governance-during-covid19-pandemic#.YqChL6jMKUk.
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during the pandemic.114 The AAUP does not have the ABA’s enforcement power
as an accrediting agency or the AALS’s sanctioning power as an institutional
membership organization. But the AAUP has a well-developed protocol for
conducting investigations like this,115 and it has been doing them since 1930 on
academic freedom issues. If a college or university is censured or sanctioned, it
is listed on the AAUP’s website as a censured or sanctioned school with a link
to the AAUP’s investigation report,116 which can have a predictable effect on
the institution’s reputation.
In May 2021, the AAUP issued a report detailing its investigating committee’s
findings about events at the eight colleges and universities.117 The report found
that these schools were examples of widespread “opportunistic exploitations
of catastrophic events” by administrators to erode faculty roles in governance,
illustrated by the nationally reported statement, in a candid moment, by an
administrator at a university that was not under investigation: “Never waste
a good pandemic.”118 The report concluded that the “COVID-19 pandemic
has presented the most serious challenges to academic governance in the last
fifty years.”119 In June 2021, the AAUP put six of the eight schools on its list of
sanctioned institutions.120
The AAUP investigation and sanctions were mostly focused on the governance aspects of budget and job security issues—not on curricular questions at
the level of how specific courses are to be taught.
XI. Law School Governance Throughout the Pandemic—and Afterward
During the pandemic, the real modality choice has been between online
teaching and simultaneous hybrid teaching.121 A simultaneous hybrid modality
114. Am. Ass’n of Univ. Professors, AAUP Launches a COVID-19 Governance Investigation (Sept. 21, 2020),
https://www.aaup.org/media-release/aaup-launches-covid-19-governance-investigation#.
YqCjvKjMKUl. An eighth school was added in October.
115.

Standards for Investigations in the Area of College and University Governance, Summer 2020 AAUP Bull.
18 (2020), https://www.aaup.org/sites/default/files/StandardsforInvestigations2020.pdf.

116. Am. Ass’n of Univ. Professors, Censure List, https://www.aaup.org/our-programs/academicfreedom/censure-list (last visited 7/5/2022); Am. Ass’n of Univ. Professors, Sanctioned Institutions,
https://www.aaup.org/our-work/shared-governance/sanctioned-institutions (last visited
7/5/2022).
117.

Am. Ass’n of Univ. Professors, Special Report: COVID-19 and Academic Governance
(2021), https://www.aaup.org/special-report-covid-19-and-academic-governance.

118. Id. at 2. The administrator tried to walk back the comment after faculty at his school became
outraged, but “to many faculty members the gaffe seemed to exemplify what in political
circles is called saying the quiet part out loud.” Id.
119. Id. at 34.
120. Report of the Committee on College and University Governance, 2020–21, Bulletin of the AAUP (July
2021) at 104, https://www.aaup.org/issue/summer-2021-bulletin.
121. See Part IV, supra. To explain the pandemic governance issues, I have had to explain in the
modality options available. For the record, I should describe briefly my own teaching experience during the pandemic.
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requires specific faculty approval for at least two reasons. First, simultaneous
hybrid teaching is partially online, and almost every course in a curriculum
has been approved by default for exclusively in-person instruction. For reasons
explained in Part IV, the fact that a portion of the learning happens in a classroom
doesn’t make a simultaneous hybrid course a classroom course.
The second reason is that simultaneous hybrid teaching is a separate and
unique modality with features not found in pure in-person teaching and not
found in pure online teaching. A simultaneous hybrid modality’s merits and
demerits might differ from one course to another, which only a faculty has the
ability to judge.122 Despite simultaneous hybrid’s faults, there might be reasons
		
From March 2020 through January 2022, I taught fully online. I’m not an advocate of
online teaching, and I’m skeptical of claims made by its advocates although I’m more openminded now than I had been.
		One of my courses is Contracts. Most of the course works better in the classroom. But
after the pandemic I’ll still hold a few classes online. Using Zoom’s screen-share I can put a
difficult section of the Uniform Commercial Code or the Restatement on students’ computer
screens so we can dissect it. On a book page, UCC § 2-207, for example, can seem impenetrable. But in Word or WordPerefect on a computer screen, the words can come alive. What
would § 2-207 look like if the words were to say what they really mean? Where are the gaps
where courts have had to add meaning? Why are those gaps there? (This involves some UCC
history.) What would § 2-207 look like if the gaps weren’t there? Words come alive when they
become untethered and can move. Students can learn how to interpret law by interrogating
its wording aggressively.
		One-to-one conversations with students work better online than in my office. As a student
and later as a teacher, I found the best form of education to be the proverbial image of Horace
Mann and a student, sitting on a log talking. In Zoom, the student and I are guests in each
other’s homes, which is as close as you can get to sitting on the log. In my office, students
naturally assume the official student role. On Zoom, we’re two human beings talking about
problems and how to solve them.
		I also teach a course called Drafting and Negotiating Contracts and Statutes. To my
surprise, it’s entirely more effective on Zoom than in a classroom. The quality difference is
so thorough and so fundamental that in October 2020 my faculty approved a permanent
conversion of the course so that it will be taught 100% online even after the pandemic ends.
		Drafting can be taught better online because with screen-share the class can collectively
draft and redraft contractual or statutory provisions. To students, this has a unique immediacy
because they’re in their workspaces at home where they do their own writing. On their screens
during class nearly all the real estate is taken up by the provision being drafted or redrafted.
As the group tries out ideas and makes decisions, with the teacher typing the words students
want, the words appear and change on the screen where students are accustomed to seeing
their own words while they write. To students, this doesn’t feel like a classroom exercise. It
feels real. They’re experiencing and internalizing the process of writing.
		Many aspects of negotiation can be taught better through Zoom. Lawyers now negotiate
less in person and more by telephone and email, often with proposed documents as attachments. Teaching this process in a classroom is like using a beach as a place to teach opera
singing. The venue undermines the skill being taught. For students to learn this kind of
negotiation, nobody—not the teacher nor any of the students—should be in the same room as
anyone else. The only effective venue is Zoom, with a few students’ cameras turned off and
with their emails and proposed documents on screen while the students negotiate.
122. In 1999, the AAUP issued a Statement on Online and Distance Education, in which this
appears: “As with all other curricular matters, the faculty should have primary responsibility
for determining the policies and practices of the institution in regard to distance education.
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to use it in some instances—for example, in the fall semester of the first year, to
help students form personal connections with teachers, other students, and the
school. Only a faculty has the expertise to make an informed decision about
this, which is what a faculty has the authority to do.
A faculty that has the authority to permit online teaching also has the authority
to require it.123 A faculty can require that online teaching—and no other modality—
be used in every course. If a faculty believes that in some courses simultaneous
hybrid’s advantages outweigh its disadvantages, the faculty has the authority
to require that every course be taught online with those specific exceptions. A
faculty has the authority to make these decisions one semester at a time. And if
a public health situation deteriorates to a point where the only way to deliver
a quality education is to move courses online, a faculty has the authority to do
that because a faculty has a responsibility to produce lawyers.
If, at a particular school, administrators have made decisions that properly
belong to a faculty, a precedent has been set. The faculty might want to consider
ways of making sure that that precedent doesn’t become part of institutional
memory, citable in future years to rationalize other intrusions on faculty
governance.
Regardless of how decisions have been made, where a simultaneous hybrid
modality has been used or where true in-person teaching has occurred during
the pandemic, many faculty members who have taught that way have suffered
The rules governing distance education and its technologies should be approved by vote of
the faculty concerned or of a representative faculty body, officially adopted by the appropriate
authorities, and published and distributed to all concerned.” Am. Ass’n of Univ. Professors, Statement on Online and Distance Education (1999), https://www.aaup.org/report/
statement-online-and-distance-education.
123. A faculty would need to satisfy ABA accreditation requirements.
		
Throughout the pandemic, the ABA has given variances to law schools to teach online as
much as needed for public health reasons. In February 2022, the ABA decided that it would
no longer require applications for those variances. They’re automatic. The rules governing
these variances are in the ABA’s Guidance Memo Regarding Continuation of COVID-19 Emergency
Variances (March 2022), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/legal_education/accreditation/
consultants_memos/.
		A variance exempts a school temporarily from requirements in the ABA Standards. In
August 2020, the ABA “reserved and deleted” its Standard 306, which had governed “distance education courses”—courses where students are separated from teachers for more than
one-third of the instructional time. Now (July 2022), the ABA is in the process of adopting
a new Standard 306, setting out requirements for distance education courses, and amending
Standard 311(e), which includes two limitations. One limits a student’s total distance education courses to a maximum of one-third of the 83 credit hours required by the ABA to earn
a J.D. The more practical way to express this rule, without changing the meaning, is that at
least two-thirds of 83 credits must be earned in non-distance education courses. Many schools
require more than 83 credits for graduation. The ABA requirement is two-thirds of 83. It isn’t
two-thirds of the graduation credits required by the school. The other limitation is that no
more than “10 of those credit hours may be granted during the first one-third of a student’s
program of legal education.”
		
Neither of these limitations apply to J.D. programs authorized to be taught predominantly
online under Standard 105(a)(12)(ii), for example the special distance education J.D. programs
at the schools listed in note 50, supra.
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something like battle fatigue. Every time they went into a classroom, many of
them showed—in a word I hope we remember for a very long time—courage.
Appendix A
Total Deaths per 100,000 Population by State as of June 30, 2022
Alabama

404

Montana

322

Alaska

171

Nebraska

224

Arizona

419

Nevada

359

Arkansas

384

New Hampshire

190

California

232

New Jersey

383

Colorado

222

New Mexico

379

Connecticut

310

New York (except NYC)

255

Delaware

306

New York City

485

District of Columbia

191

North Carolina

242

Florida

356

North Dakota

301

Georgia

363

Ohio

332

Hawaii

105

Oklahoma

366

Idaho

278

Oregon

185

Illinois

305

Pennsylvania

357

Indiana

355

Rhode Island

341

Iowa

307

South Carolina

350

Kansas

307

South Dakota

332

Kentucky

366

Tennessee

391

Louisiana

375

Texas

300

Maine

180

Utah

151

Maryland

245

Vermont

104

Massachusetts

304

Virginia

242

Michigan

370

Washington

174

Minnesota

233

West Virginia

394

Mississippi

421

Wisconsin

254

Missouri

338

Wyoming

317
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Appendix B
Fall 2020 Modality Decision-Making at Forty-Seven Law Schools
Region abbreviations: NE=Northeast. MW=Midwest. S=South. W=West.
Milieu abbreviations:
Mega metro = metropolitan area population of 6 million or more.
Metro = 2 to 6 million.
Small metro = 500K to 2 million.
Small city/town = less than 500K
“Individual faculty decided for themselves” means that either—
(1) faculty stated individual preferences and were scheduled accordingly or
(2) faculty who thought it unwise to teach in person had to state a reason
but virtually every reason was accepted and all faculty who preferred to teach
online did so.
Clinics aren’t included in these responses because they are more answerable
to client needs, courts, and ethical obligations than to university administrators,
who tend not to think of them as classroom courses, although that should not be
taken to exclude the possibility that university interference might have occurred.
School
(region)

Type

Milieu

NE-1

private

mega metro

Individual faculty decided for themselves.

NE-2

private

mega metro

In-person sections taught by volunteers, including administrators.

NE-3

private

metro

Individual faculty decided for themselves—
nearly all 1st-yr classes taught online.

NE-4

private

metro

Faculty applied to teach remotely based
on personal reasons, age, and family situations—applications usually approved.

NE-5

private

metro

Faculty applied to teach remotely based
on personal reasons, age, and family situations—applications usually approved.

NE-6

public

small city/
town

Faculty applied to teach remotely based
on personal reasons, age, and family situations—applications usually approved.

NE-7

private

metro

Individual faculty decided for themselves—
most 1st-yr classes taught online.

private

mega metro

Decanal decision based on a faculty consensus—all classes taught online.

NE-9

private

mega metro

Dean granted all requests for remote teaching regardless of the reason. Most faculty
teaching in person or simultaneous hybrid.

NE-10

public

mega metro

Individual faculty were given choices, but
the school went 100% online because of local community public health conditions.

NE-8

Result & process
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NE-11

public

mega metro

University almost entirely online. Administrative decision reflected widespread faculty
consensus.

NE-12

public

mega metro

University almost entirely online. Administrative decision reflected widespread faculty
consensus.

NE-13

private

metro

Administrative decision consistent with a
faculty consensus—all classes taught online.

NE-14

private

mega metro

Administrative decision consistent with a
faculty consensus—all classes taught online.

NE-15

private

mega metro

University decision to go online and simultaneous hybrid. Law school faculty met every week or every other week after March
2020 and fully supported the decisions.
Faculty and decanal consensus was that
teaching would be online except for a few
1st-yr courses taught via simultaneous hybrid by volunteers, but the school went
100% online because of local community
public health conditions.

NE-16

private

mega metro

NE-17

private

mega metro

Simultaneous hybrid sections taught by
volunteers. All else online.

NE-18

private

mega metro

Decanal decision in consultation with individual faculty depending on the nature of
the course and class size.

NE-19

private

small city/
town

Faculty voted to put all courses online.
Overruled by the university, which required
a simultaneous hybrid format instead although several upper-level courses went
online.
University required that all courses be inperson, which became simultaneous hybrid
because of COVID or COVID-exposed
students. Classes with enrollment too large
to fit in socially-distanced classrooms went
online.

NE-20

private

mega metro

MW-1

public

metro

MW-2

public

small city/
town

MW-3

public

metro

Individual faculty decided for themselves.

MW-4

public

small city/
town

Individual faculty decided for themselves.

MW-5

private

mega metro

No one teaching in person who doesn’t
want to.

Individual faculty decided for themselves.
Decanal decision based on faculty consensus, including many summer faculty meetings—all classes taught online only.
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University pressured school to require inperson teaching unless a teacher could justify remaining off-campus. Limited decanal
amelioration.

MW-6

private

mega metro

MW-7

private

metro

Individual faculty decided for themselves.

S-1

public

small metro

Individual faculty decided for themselves.

S-2

public

small city/
town

Individual faculty decided for themselves.

S-3

private

small metro

University and deans decided after accommodations based on personal and family
situations—no faculty consultation.

S-4

public

metro

Individual faculty decided for themselves.

S-5

private

small city/
town

Individual faculty decided for themselves.

S-6

private

small metro

Imposition of simultaneous hybrid teaching over faculty wishes.

S-7

public

mega metro

Individual faculty decided for themselves.

private

small city/
town

To be entirely online, a faculty member
needed to get an ADA accommodation.
Age treated as irrelevant. Policy created
without faculty consultation.

S-8
S-9

public

small metro

Individual faculty decided for themselves.

S-10

private

metro

Individual faculty decided for themselves.

S-11

public

mega metro

Individual faculty decided for themselves.

S-12

public

small city/
town

University required as much in-person
teaching as possible, using simultaneous
hybrid, within public health requirements.

S-13

private

mega metro

Consultative decision-making. Several 1styr courses simultaneous hybrid. Others online.

W-1

public

small city/
town

Only volunteers teaching in person—nearly
all courses taught online.

W-2

private

metro

Decanal decisions with accommodations
granted.

public

small metro

University formula would have required significant percentage of in-person teaching,
but the school went 100% online because of
local community public health conditions.

W-4

public

small metro

Consultative decision-making. Several 1styr courses simultaneous hybrid. Nearly all
others online.

W-5

public

metro

W-3

Individual faculty decided for themselves.
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W-6

private

metro

Individual faculty were to be given choices,
but the school went 100% online because of
local community public health conditions.

W-7

public

mega metro

Formal and informal decanal/faculty conversations led to a consensus to go online.
Decanal position that no teacher who felt
that it would be unsafe would be compelled
to go into a classroom.

W-8

private

mega metro

University said anyone without an ADA
accommodation could be made to teach in
person. Limited decanal amelioration.

